Bandits, Eunuchs, and the Son of Heaven

From Banditry to Rebellion and Back Again

121 6 From Banditry to Rebellion and Back Again Flamed by the winds of latent discontent, widespread drought, military incompetence, and government hesitancy, the small sporadic sparks of armed conflict grew into a mighty conflagration, spreading from Beijing in the north to the Yangzi River in the south, from the Pacific Ocean in the east to the Taihang Mountains in the west.1 In the process, the 1510 Rebellion deeply affected the lives of tens of thousands of people, tested the resources and ability of the court, and influenced perceptions of Chinese strength throughout East Asia. What had begun as a relatively common event—rivalry among palace eunuchs and dislocation in patronage networks—ended as a national rebellion, requiring more than two years, hundreds of thousands of ounces of silver, and thousands of lives to quell. Yet for all the high drama and furious turmoil, violence’s role in the social order of the capital region emerged surprisingly little changed in the wake of the rebellion. Banditry, administrative interstices, and ties among men of force, local elites, and government officials all survived the hazards of the battlefield. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first traces the intermittent but high-stakes negotiations between the Liu brothers, Tiger Yang, and their followers on the one hand, and the imperial court and high officials on the other. The second chronicles the violence of the 1510 Rebellion as it grew both in intensity and scope. The final section revisits the question of violence and banditry in the counties south of Beijing in the wake of the suppression of the 1510 Rebellion. Rather than attempt a comprehensive account of the rebellion, the following narrative hews to the main themes developed in chapters 2 through 5. National issues and the evolving military response of the imperial government to the rebellion are briefly noted, but emphasis is placed on how the rebels absorbed local outlaw groups, how local communities dealt with violent crisis, and how the imperial government balanced military and diplomatic efforts to end the rebellion. 122 From Banditry to Rebellion and Back Again We have examined the consequences of the Liu brothers’ somewhat adventitious involvement in the complex interactions of court and local power from the events of 1508 to the explosion of 1509–1510. That quickly became a massive armed insurrection, the largest domestic military challenge to Ming authority in the sixteenth century. Having explored the initiating elements, we must now follow the spreading rebellion across several provinces, and its violent suppression two years later. Violence and Suasion During the spring of 1511, bandit activity gradually spread from Shandong to the Northern and Southern Metropolitan Areas, to northeastern Henan, and to northern Huguang. By mid-April, the minister of personnel at the time, Yang Yiqing (1454–1530), had submitted to the throne a lengthy policy paper on banditry in North China. One of the foremost officials of the early sixteenth century, Yang had passed the highest level of civil service examination at the exceptionally young age of eighteen, had developed expertise in frontier affairs during his many years in China’s northwest, and had helped orchestrate the eunuch Liu Jin’s fall from power. He was one of the most powerful men at court, and the emperor held him in great esteem.2 His detailed report sheds light on contemporary problems as seen by a very capable senior official. When confronted with bandit attacks, most local officials chose between two strategies, Yang wrote. The first was passive defense— that is, closing the gates of the city and defending from the walls or filling in the city gates with pounded earth. The second was appeasement. Local officials often prepared feasts, welcomed the bandits, and offered gifts in hopes they and their city would be spared.3 Yang held that this second strategy was disastrous. Not only did the bandits grow more confident and daring as local representatives of the central government begged for mercy, but inhabitants of the city began to doubt the ability of the government to cope with crisis.4 Yang stressed the need to improve the economic conditions of people in areas ravaged by bandit raiding through the elimination of official malfeasance, the granting of tax amnesties, and the distribution of relief to needy households.5 If the people directly benefited from these reforms and were able to make ends meet, Yang insisted, they would be content with their fields and unlikely to follow the bandits.6 Yang did not...