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Notes Introduction Epigraph. Joachim Wach, Introduction to the History of Religions, ed. Joseph M. Kitigawa (New York: Macmillan, 1988), 90. 1. The person most responsible for spreading such a view of Korea was probably William Elliot Griffis, whose book Corea, the Hermit Nation was one of the first comprehensive histories of Korea in a Western language. First published in 1882, it went through nine editions in thirty years and was must reading for missionaries going to Korea. Everett N. Hunt Jr., Protestant Pioneers in Korea (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1980), 54. 2. L. George Paik, The History of Protestant Missions in Korea, 1832–1910 (1929; reprint, Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1987), 377. 3. Sinanggye (August 1988): 63. The revivals recorded a total attendance of about 1.5 million. Also see Sinanggye (November 1988): 77. 4. David Brudnoy, “Japan’s Experiment in Korea,” Monumenta Nipponica 2, no. 1 (1970): 155–195; Bruce Cumings, “The Legacy of Japanese Colonialism in Korea,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 478–496. 5. Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, vol. 1, Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 113, 121. 6. I recognize that a debate exists on the status of (neo-)Confucianism as a religion . Here I agree with John Duncan, who takes a Durkheimian position that Confucianism can be considered as “a commonly shared religious system that helps give definition to a large community.” See his “Proto-nationalism in Premodern Korea,” in Perspectives on Korea, ed. Sang-Oak Lee and Duk-Soo Park (Sydney: Wild Peony, 1998), 198–221. 7. According to a government census published in 1987, 483,366 South Koreans , or about one percent of the population, claimed Confucianism as their religion in 1985. This figure contrasted with 8,059,624 (20 percent) for Buddhism and 8,354,679 (21 percent) for Christianity (combining Catholics and Protestants). Minister of Economic Planning Board, 13th Population and Housing Census of the Republic of Korea 153 154 154 | Notes to Page xii (Seoul: Ministry of Economic Planning Board, 1985), 288, table 6. On (neo-)Confucianism ’s influence on Korea, see Martina Deuchler, The Confucian Transformation of Korea: A Study of Society and Ideology (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies , Harvard University, 1992); William Theodore de Bary and JaHyun Kim Haboush, eds., The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); JaHyun Kim Haboush and Martina Deuchler, eds., Culture and the State in Late Chosŏn Korea (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 1999); and John Duncan, “Confucian Social Values in Contemporary South Korea,” in Religion and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Lewis R. Lancaster and Richard K. Payne (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1997), 49–73. 8. James Huntley Grayson states that Korea’s monastic Buddhism is especially dynamic, having no equal in East Asia. See his Korea: A Religious History, rev. ed. (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 1. See also Robert E. Buswell Jr., The Zen Monastic Experience: Buddhist Practice in Contemporary Korea (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); and Jaeryong Shim, Korean Buddhism: Tradition and Transformation (Seoul: Jimoondang, 1999). 9. Yu Tongsik [Ryu Tong-shik], Han’guk mugyo ŭi yŏksa wa kujo (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1975); Hyun-key Kim Hogarth, Korean Shamanism and Cultural Nationalism (Seoul: Jimoondang, 1999); Chungmoo Choi, “Hegemony and Shamanism: The State, the Elite, and Shamans in Contemporary Korea,” in Religion and Society in Contemporary Korea, ed. Lewis R. Lancaster and Richard K. Payne (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1997), 19–48. 10. By “Kim-Il-Sungism” I mean the set of beliefs (which incorporate some Marxism-Leninism but more significantly the North Korean ideology known as juche), practices, and aura of (quasi) sacrality that center around the person of Kim Il Sung (and later of his son Kim Jong Il). Granted, to some, Kim-Il-Sungism might not qualify as a religion. But if religion is defined in a functional sense as the organization of individual and/or societal lives in terms of realities that are considered sacred—and salvific—then Kim-Il-Sungism qualifies at least as what Paul Tillich has called a quasi religion. Regardless of what outsiders may think of it, for most North Koreans (at least till the death of the founder in 1994), Kim-Il-Sungism has loomed large as a salvific system that...

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