Abstract

This chapter focuses on Richard Rorty's and Hilary Putnam's neopragmatisms, especially as they emerge as approaches to the relation between science and religion. The Rorty vs. Putnam contrast is crucial for understanding neopragmatism, also because it is an opposition between secular and religiously engaged pragmatisms. The discussion of the issue of realism vs. antirealism in the philosophy of religion (already touched upon in the introduction and chapter 1) is also continued, not only because the opposition between Rortyan and Putnamian pragmatisms largely centers around this issue but also because there have been other neopragmatist, and closely related, recent contributions to the realism debate. The neopragmatist contribution to the debate over the role of religion in the public sphere will also be briefly taken up. Finally, the concept of hope will be explored: Rorty's deflationary account of this notion is contrasted with James's (and Kant's) more substantial account(s) examined in chapter 1.

Share