Speculative Grace: Bruno Latour and Object-Oriented Theology

Foreword

Foreword L E V I R . B R YA N T . . . in the end, only theologians can be truly atheistic . . . —Jacques Lacan Since its inception with the work of Graham Harman, object-oriented ontology (OOO) has had an uneasy relationship with theology.1 While OOO has been influential 1 The term ‘‘object-oriented philosophy’’ was proposed by Graham Harman in his book Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. ‘‘Object-oriented philosophy’’ (OOP) refers to Harman’s particular metaphysics of objects, while ‘‘object-oriented ontology’’ (OOO) refers to any metaphysics which argues that being is composed of objects or substances. The relation between object-oriented ontology and objectoriented philosophy is thus a relation between genus and species. Any metaphysics which claims that being is composed of substances is an object-oriented ontology, while different philosophies theorize objects in different and opposed ways. Object-oriented ontologies are as diverse as xiii in fields as diverse as media studies, literary criticism, ethnography , art criticism, history, biology, and rhetoric, it has been difficult to see how something like an object-oriented theology might be possible. Indeed, until the publication of the book presently before the reader, it has appeared that OOO and theology have been destined to be opposed. Although formulations of OOO differ from one another in how they theorize the being of objects, the dominant strains of object-oriented ontology2 are united in holding that being is composed of objects or substances, that objects exist independent of their relations to other objects, and that objects are withdrawn from one another such that they do not directly relate. As a consequence, variants of OOO have, with varying degrees of explicitness, tended to defend a ‘‘flat ontology’’ in which all objects are treated as existing on equal ontological footing.3 Within the framework of flat ontologies, while one object may enjoy greater power and influence than another object, there is no object that is the sovereign of all the others nor any object that differs in kind from all the others. These core claims generate the tension between OOO and theology. Historically, Western theology has offered the options of theism, deism, and pantheism. At the risk of being reductive, theism argues for the existence of a personal God that designs and creates the world, is capable of the metaphysics of Aristotle, Latour, Harman, and a host of other thinkers. 2 At present, the dominant strains of object-oriented ontology consist of the works of Ian Bogost (alien phenomenology), Levi R. Bryant (onticology ), Graham Harman (object-oriented philosophy), and Timothy Morton (dark ecology). 3 For a detailed discussion of flat ontology, cf. Levi Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Open Humanities Press, 2011), 245–90. xiv Foreword intervening in the world in miraculous ways that violate the laws of physics, that is concerned with the welfare of individual persons, and that is responsive to prayer. By contrast, deism argues that, though God designed the laws of nature and created the universe, he then set ‘‘his’’ creation loose to unfold of its own accord. As a consequence, the deistic God does not respond to prayer nor intervene in miraculous ways. Finally, pantheism argues that God and nature are one and the same such that God is simply the unfolding of nature according to the laws of physics, and each being is both a manifestation of and element in God. Each of these theologies tend to share the thesis that God is omnipotent, omniscient, and infinite. And, with the exception of pantheism , these theologies tend to hold that God is a preeminent being, transcendent to creation and different in kind from other objects. OOO is inconsistent with the claims of these theological variations. Insofar as OOO argues that being is composed of discrete units that are independent of their relations, it is necessarily at odds with pantheism. Where pantheism argues that all entities are interrelated elements in the being of God, OOO rejects the thesis that all entities are related to one another or that they form a totality. Where theism and deism generally argue that God is a preeminent being, transcendent to all of creation, OOO favors a flat ontology without any transcendent sovereign. In this respect, if God does exist ‘‘he’’ would be just one being among others. However, the point on which OOO and the theologies of theism and deism are most starkly opposed...