Later Medieval Metaphysics: Ontology, Language, and Logic

Introduction

1 Introduction Charles Bolyard and Rondo Keele Medieval metaphysics and modern-day metaphysics share much common ground; many issues of concern to medieval metaphysicians would be quite familiar to those who find themselves in a present-day metaphysics seminar. These earlier philosophers worried about the nature of change, the fundamental structure of reality (and of the entities within that reality), identity, time, and so on. It is easy to look past this fact, however, because of the fundamental ontology they adhered to: for them, God, angels, and miracles were entities and phenomena that had to fit into their metaphysical systems. Just as contemporary metaphysicians work with the ontology of modern science, so too the medievals worked within their theological ontologies. Though this book’s intended audience is primarily specialists in or students of medieval philosophy, helping contemporary nonmedievalist philosophers see past these initial differences in language, terminology, and context is a secondary aim. In this volume, we concentrate in particular on some intricate and fascinating discussions that took place in metaphysics during the Later Middle Ages, centering on some thirteenth- and fourteenth-century debates in the Christian West. These discussions drew heavily from the twelfth-century rediscovery of the full Aristotelian corpus and the Islamic and Jewish philosophical works that were translated alongside it. Though we touch on only a few of the many thinkers who considered these issues, our aim is to give the reader insights into some of the most central metaphysical discussions in which they engaged. Perhaps unsurprisingly, medieval philosophers divided their enquiries along different lines than we do today. For most of them (John Buridan is a notable exception here), theological studies were their main focus, and their philosophy is usually found under the cover of seemingly unrelated discussions of 2 charles bolyard and rondo keele such topics as, for example, the nature of the transubstantiation. In addition to this entanglement, medieval metaphysics is often continuous with medieval discussions of logic, language, and epistemology. While some elements of these philosophers’ works are unquestionably “pure” treatments of metaphysical problems, most are not. And to ignore these mixed treatments is to ignore much of what is important in medieval metaphysics. Given these realities, we have not attempted to rid our investigations of their contextual trappings; our readers should not be surprised to find the discussions leading in directions that would be unanticipated from our volume’s title alone. So what else is distinctive about later medieval metaphysics? In order to begin to untangle the mass of arguments and positions that is medieval philosophy, it’s best to begin with a rough and admittedly oversimplifying formula. Let’s start with the following (paraphrased) claim by Paul Vincent Spade, and work from there: In order to understand Medieval Philosophy generally, one need only achieve a thorough grounding in Ancient Greek and Neoplatonic Philosophy , mix in the doctrine of contingent creation, and turn the crank. Medieval accounts of the nature of the soul, God, free will, and change easily follow.1 Now we can expand on this. The single most important influence on the metaphysical thought of the Later Middle Ages was Aristotle. Plato was well known, yet only a few of his works were translated into Latin; most medievals knew of Plato through only one of his dialogues (roughly half of the Timaeus), and through multiple secondary accounts given by earlier philosophers such as Augustine, Cicero, or the commentators who attempted to reconcile Neoplatonism and Aristotelian philosophy. Evidence of this focus on Aristotle is seen especially in the terminology in use: substance, accident, matter, and form are commonly referred to (though often quite differently understood) by nearly everyone who wrote during the period; references to Platonic Forms occur, but they often show only the vaguest familiarity with Plato’s discussions and arguments. In any case, despite Aristotle’s strong influence, his positions were sometimes rejected outright— for example, regarding the immortality of the soul, or as seen in William of Ockham’s famous reduction of the number of Aristotle’s categories from ten to two—and they were almost always modified or developed to a significant degree. Introduction 3 Another obvious influence was Christian theology. Though theological doctrine, then as now, was developing alongside the philosophy with which it interacted, there were some claims that had a particularly strong impact on later medieval thought. First, the Christian notion of a perfect, freely creating God was definitely not something...