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7 Efforts to Exit the War Despite the catastrophic loss of the Second Army, 1943 became a year of cautious optimism for Hungarians. For the first time it seemed that there might be another choice between the German alliance or the muchdreaded Soviet Union and Bolshevism. It even seemed possible that the war might end by giving the Anglo-Saxons a predominant voice in the peace settlement. The North Africa landing of the Anglo-American forces in November 1942, and the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad in February 1943, made it clear that the war had reached a turning point. German losses had a dynamic effect on the country. As the student leader Sándor Kiss put it: ‘‘Hitler lost battles on the eastern front one after another . . . only those who were blind, obsessed or stupid believed in the increasing use of the ‘miracle weapon’ in propaganda. The soldiers returning from the front were unanimous in reporting that the Germans would not be able to win the war.’’1 The Allied landing in North Africa was the first successful Allied operation . The rapid occupation renewed faith that the Allies were capable of decisive action and strengthened those politicians and members of the general staff who from the beginning had doubts about German victory. It showed that the Allies were capable of surprise and that they could take on a large-scale military operation, one that could change the strategic situation in Europe. The fact that the Vichy French in Algeria had been willing to join the Allies—and that the Allies had been pragmatic enough to accept—made many think that negotiations with official Hungary might somehow be acceptable to the Allies.2 In Hungary one of the most important results of the North Africa landing was that the pro-British element came again to the forefront as a serious factor to be considered. The Independence Front, which had remained dormant after the dissolution of the Historical Memorial Committee in the spring, had been newly formed just a few days before the Allied landing and became more active in the changed situation. With the urging of the Independence Front and the conservative opposition Efforts to Exit the War | 227 group around Bethlen, the government of Prime Minister Kállay increased its efforts to make contact with the British and Americans. At the same time, fear of German occupation affected every action of the government. The fear of occupation was especially paralyzing because the overwhelming desire of the Hungarian public was to maintain the status quo. As the diplomat Aladár Szegedy-Maszák remarked, ‘‘During the war we held that maintaining the status quo was of absolute importance ,’’ even though ‘‘we counted on unavoidable and necessary change . . .’’3 The majority of the population had not yet experienced the reality of war. Despite the German alliance and Hungary’s involvement in the war, the government and institutions remained intact, the parliamentary system continued, there was active participation by the opposition democratic parties. In spite of censorship the press remained fairly colorful during the war and living conditions were much better than in the neighboring countries or in Europe in general. Rezso ⬙ Peéry, a journalist from the Felvidék, who had criticized the Hungarian government in the 1930s as being ‘‘hopelessly anachronistic, lacking democracy, and allowing deplorable cultural and social conditions ,’’ wrote: ‘‘Who could have guessed that in World War II—in comparison to radical fascist Slovakia—conservative and reactionary Hungary would appear to be the last liberal European reservation among the East European countries—where during the World War II years there was a legal opposition, an existing social democratic party, and press freedom was not abolished, . . . until the German occupation in 1944.’’4 Fallout from the Don Disaster The debacle of the Second Army at the Don and the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad placed a different complexion on the war. From that time on, the arrival of the Red Army in the Carpathian Mountains became an obvious possibility. The destruction of the Second Army, one of the worst disasters in modern Hungarian history, affected every part of the Hungarian community. Although the government tried to hush up the losses, the loss of men and equipment meant that the army could not be used for the country’s own defense, and government leaders and public opinion were forced to recognize that they had underestimated the fearful strength and fighting ability of the Red Army. Chief of...

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