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Chapter 27: St. Thomas and Moral Taxonomy
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Chapter 27 ST. THOMAS AND MORAL TAXONOMY Introduction Aristotle tells us that Socrates was the first to consider moral taxonomy. We read: ‘‘Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions.’’1 We might ask ourselves why it was in the realm of morals that interest in definition first arose. Perhaps the answer has to do with Plato’s point, in the Republic,2 that interest in ousia, that is, in questions about the being of things, arises from situations in which something appears both as one and as two. We typically find, in morals, that actions that are one, according to natural being, are more than one in the order of morals. A few years ago someone asked me just how I would distinguish between murder and capital punishment. A similar question might have been raised about marital intercourse and adultery. When it was proposed that the topic for this year’s session be ‘‘Bases of Ethical Theory,’’ I thought of the many possibilities for discussion: problems concerning free choice, the role of God, the nature of man, the common good. But finally I came back to that question about murder and capital punishment. Obviously , this is a particular example of a constantly discussed and debated dimension of ethics. Is definition possible in this domain? Are some actions intrinsically good and some intrinsically bad? The definition isolates for consideration some entity having, as it were, its own boundaries, its own interior, so that one may speak of what is ‘‘intrinsic’’ to it. St. Thomas and Moral Taxonomy Definition in morals is difficult, it might seem, because actions are in singulars and ‘‘one never knows what’s coming’’ in reality, considered in its singularity. This, of course, is true, and sometimes gives rise to theories of ‘‘situation ethics.’’ Thomas Aquinas, in presenting the virtue of prudence , asks whether prudence knows singulars, and he answers, as did Aristotle, in the affirmative. But he presents the argument of an adversary as follows: ‘‘Singulars are infinite. But what are infinite cannot be comprehended by reason. Hence, prudence, which is right reason, is not of singulars .’’ And he replies: ‘‘Because the infinity of singulars cannot be comprehended by human reason, hence it is that ‘our providences are uncertain,’ as is said in Wisdom 9:14. Nevertheless, through experience, the infinite singulars are reduced to some finite [group] that occur for the most part, knowledge of which suffices for human prudence.’’3 Still, prudence is not ethical theory. As Thomas explains, arguing that although one can have the other intellectual virtues without the moral virtues, one cannot have that intellectual virtue called ‘‘prudence’’ without them: The reason for this is that prudence is right reason with respect to the objects of action [agibilium], and not merely [taking those objects ] in universal [consideration], but even in [the theater of] the particular, in which actions take place. Now, right reason requires by priority the principles from which reason proceeds. However it is necessary that reason, concerning particulars, proceed not merely from universal principles but also from particular principles. Now, concerning the universal principles of objects of action the human being is rightly equipped by the natural understanding of principles, through which man knows that nothing bad is to be done, or else through some practical science. But this does not suffice for rightly reasoning concerning particulars.4 To get a good picture of what is being proposed here, we should look at one objection and reply. The objector wants to posit intellectual virtue without moral virtue, on the basis of the priority of reason over sense appetite, reason even being the mover of sense appetite. To this Thomas replies: ‘‘Reason, inasmuch as it is apprehensive of the end, precedes the appetite for the end; but the appetite for the end precedes reason reasoning in order to choose those things that are [ordered] toward an end, which [task [44.200.193.174] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 12:56 GMT) Wisdom, Law, and Virtue of reason] pertains to prudence. Just as, also, in theoretical matters, the understanding of principles is the principle of reason as syllogizing.’’5 We see, thus, that there is a role for intellect and reason, as prior to all appetite, and considering the universal domain of...