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9 Feminine Sexuality Introductory Remarks: Patriarchy Derrida’s remark that the ‘‘withdrawal . . . of the dyad leads towards the other sexual difference’’ condenses his criticism of the binary determination of sexual difference not in the name of a hysterical proliferation of differences (which amounts to a covert promotion of sameness) but in the name of a différance that is the equivalent of Lacan’s notion of the traumatic Real.1 In what follows, I aim to establish the basis for linking this difference between two kinds of difference (binary difference and différance ) to the Lacanian account of feminine sexuality, dealt with in part 4, by arguing that for Derrida too ‘‘the dyad’’ (or binary difference) to be withdrawn is an effect of what one could call a ‘‘masculine libidinal operation ,’’ whereas ‘‘the other sexual difference’’ is an effect of a ‘‘feminine libidinal operation.’’ One might immediately suspect this sex-specific labeling , but, as I shall try to explain before turning to Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche in Spurs, both Derrida and Lacan have good, subversive reasons for retaining this nomenclature. For both thinkers, these libidinal operations must be understood as ‘‘structural’’ or noncontingent ‘‘universals.’’ Insofar as these universals are Real, they are essentially not-yet either feminine or masculine. Instead, their contingently given, manifest character or meaning (for example, as specifically feminine or masculine operations) is an effect of the unconscious Symbolic Order (the ‘‘big Other’’) that underpins contemporary 261 social life. Speaking in general terms, Lacan’s Symbolic Order names the unspoken rules that tacitly govern any language game or discourse. As Žižek points out, these unspoken rules are, for example, responsible for all the ‘‘stereotypes and obligatory scenes’’ from whose invidious comfort one may find a degree of relief in non-Hollywood movies.2 Such tacit rules tend to remain implicit, subtle, and unremarkable until something goes wrong, does not work out, or seems amiss. Indeed, their very existence (if not their precise character) is always clearer to ‘‘outsiders,’’ particularly to those who, having transgressed them without knowing it, stand mystified by the behavior of associates. The economic logic of the dyad, of binary thinking, may be explained as precisely an attempt to tie the unspoken rules of a discourse into a secure and determinate system by binding them all to a central point de capiton or ‘‘quilting point’’ (a desired ‘‘master signifier that guarantees the consistency of the big Other’’) and subsequently to defend its hegemony against both external forces and internal corruption.3 According to Lacan, the ‘‘Phallus’’ is a generic term that covers all of the particular, contingent determinations of this quilting point. In Lacan’s words, ‘‘it is the signifier intended to designate as a whole the effects of the signified, in that the signifier conditions them by its presence as a signifier.’’4 It therefore has many nicknames—‘‘center,’’ ‘‘transcendental signified,’’ ‘‘master signi- fier,’’ to which we may now add ‘‘empty signifier’’ and ‘‘zero institution.’’ In other words, it is a generic term for that which would give unity, consistency , sense, or truth to a discourse were it only achievable or accessible, which it is not. Yet it is unconsciously accepted, as noted with Žižek in the previous chapter, that the rules of a discourse form a coherent or meaningful system , knotted together at a quilting point, even though nobody knows precisely how to determine it, and inevitably, when put to the test, the consequence is irresolvable conflict over what it really means.5 ‘‘Phallic logic,’’ accordingly, names the operation by which we attempt to secure the discourse by giving specific content to the empty signifier. Again, there are plenty of nicknames for this operation: one may call it, for example , the economic aporia, a paranoid libidinal style, a dream of totality, or ‘‘the logic of the Law and its constitutive exclusion.’’ Importantly, as Žižek notes, Lacan emphasizes that the ‘‘quilting points’’ specified in phallic logic are contingently determined impositions, each of which is, as much as any other, only a relatively adequate appropriation of the Real and therefore in some sense a fabrication, fake, or necessary fiction, ‘‘an empty signifier without a signified,’’ adopted for the sake of consistency and efficiency.6 If this is so, each determinate quilting point essentially 262 Derrida Vis-à-vis Lacan [18.116.36.192] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 08:48...

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