John Dewey Between Pragmatism and Constructivism

Three

three constructivism: diversity of approaches and connections with pragmatism Kersten Reich  In this section I give a survey of basic constructivist assumptions and different constructivist approaches, then briefly elaborate on some connections between social constructivist approaches— especially the Cologne program of interactive constructivism—and John Dewey’s Pragmatism. Constructivist Core Assumptions Present-day approaches in the social sciences and humanities are more and more characterized by specialized discourses operating in particular scientific fields. ‘‘Local’’ networks operate to a surprising degree on their own terms, without even taking notice of similar or related work done in other networks. Contacts are lacking because of the increasing complexity and confusion of information in postmodern societies, which more and more entail specific research circles meeting at specific conferences or symposia and publishing their {  }  diversity of approaches and connections with pragmatism work in specific journals, without finding sufficient contact to other circles, even compatible ones. A survey of present-day constructivist approaches supplies evidence for this observation, as we will see. But, also, the relation between Pragmatism and constructivism, to my mind, largely testifies to a new failure of understanding—a failure that we wish to overcome with the present volume. We know, however , that even if we succeed, our attempt will eventually be hardly more than another contribution in a largely confused field. Nevertheless , it is an attempt to recover some clear views. Throughout the twentieth century and up to the present day, constructivist theories have become increasingly more significant. Presently there is a diversity of approaches that have become influential, partly in the natural sciences, but especially in the humanities and social sciences. These approaches build on an interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary design. They have in common the attempt to elaborate and define a concept of viability that accounts for what scientific approaches, methods, and practical applications fit the currently crucial issues of inquiry, knowledge, and problem solving. And, if we discount for the moment some differences that I will discuss later, they have in common a threefold definition of science. 1. Constructions Unlike metaphysical or realist approaches, constructivists do not look for copies or mirrorings of an outer reality in the human mind. Rather, they see humans as observers, participants, and agents1 who actively generate and transform the patterns through which they construct the realities that fit them. Although in everyday practices these constructions often appear to be merely subjective, we must not forget the social contexts in which they are always embedded; thus there is no such thing as purely subjective constructions, but constructions and versions of realities are always mixtures emerging from transactions with already existing (cultural and other) realities. In science, we use discursive practices to generate these transactions and constructions ; therefore our scientific constructions are not arbitrary or kersten reich  merely subjective, although they depend on the unique and concrete perspectives of the observers, participants, and agents involved. These constructors are embedded in the social and cultural conditions of their time. Only in this context and on this background can they claim, and try to realize, positions of autonomy and deliberation. As subjective agents they may possibly change the contexts of their time, but their dependence on these contexts also influences their possibilities . With the transition from modernity to late modernity or postmodernity (see Bauman 1993, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2000; Giddens 1991) and the attendant increase in degrees of freedom—as manifested in philosophical discourse, e.g., by the debates on deconstruction and poststructuralism—the constructivist assumption of the reality constructions of observers gains explicit acknowledgement. Constructivists, to be sure, suppose that observers have constructed their realities already in former times. But this constructive agency could easily go unnoticed because people mostly believed that they were just detecting elements of a divine order or some natural law. They were oblivious to the importance of their own contributions in those constructions. To the degree, however, that in more recent times radically diverse perspectives and versions of the world appeared in succession and juxtaposition, to the degree that even in science diversity could no longer be restricted by the temporary dominance of certain schools or traditions, the relativity of truth claims has more and more come to the fore. And with the acknowledgement of this relativity goes an increased consideration of both the constructive nature of those claims and the singularity of the events...