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{ } introduction: the treachery and ambivalence of loyalty 1. John J. McDermott, introduction to The Philosophy of Loyalty, by Josiah Royce (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), vii. 2. Ibid., vii. 3. Sissela Bok, “Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility,” New York University Education Quarterly 11, no. 4 (1980): 2–7, 3. 4. Frederick F. Reichheld, The Loyalty Effect: The Hidden Force behind Growth, Profits, and Lasting Value (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1996). 5. Reichheld has followed The Loyalty Effect with a sequel, Loyalty Rules! How Today’s Leaders Build Lasting Relationships (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2001). 6. For a collection of writings related to the connection of the 9/11 attacks to the ambivalence of loyalty for African Americans in particular, see Julianne Malveau and Reginna A. Green, eds., The Paradox of Loyalty: An African American Response to the War on Terrorism (Chicago: Third World Press, 2002). 1. loyalty, justice, virtue: contemporary debates 1. Alasdair MacIntyre, “Is Patriotism a Virtue?” The Lindley Lecture, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, 1984, 6. 2. Samuel Scheffler, Boundaries and Allegiances: Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 77. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., 78. 5. Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 100–1 (emphases in original). 6. Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 2007), 192. Notes notes to pages 11–16 7. See, for instance, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Kai Nielsen, “Justice as a Kind of Impartiality,” Laval théologique et philosophique 50, no. 3 (1994): 511–29; Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 8. George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality of Relationships (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 175. 9. See, for instance, Andrew Oldenquist, “Loyalties,” Journal of Philosophy 79, no. 4 (1982): 173–93; Philip Pettit, “The Paradox of Loyalty,” American Philosophical Quarterly 25, no. 2 (April 1988): 163–71; Simon Keller, The Limits of Loyalty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 10. Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, Genuine Individuals and Genuine Communities: A Roycean Public Philosophy (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997), 21. 11. Ibid. 12. Griffin Trotter, The Loyal Physician: Roycean Ethics and the Practice of Medicine (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1997), 15. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid., 19. 16. Trotter, The Loyal Physician, 15. The other two similarities cited by Trotter are that “they both adhere to a nondogmatic, fallibilistic form of absolutism; and they both may be considered, in certain crucial respects, to be pragmatists, while diverging in similar ways from classical American pragmatism as it developed in the writings of Dewey and James.” Trotter’s sole support for the former similarity is the vantage point from which MacIntyre and Royce criticize Hegel. While this similarity may obtain, it is not crucial to our purposes, nor does it seem crucial to Trotter’s, for his elaboration on the point is decidedly brief. As for the latter similarity, it is rather unusual for MacIntyre to be considered a pragmatist—while not unusual for Royce to be—so I am hesitant to agree that this similarity obtains. Even if the similarity does obtain, the extent to which MacIntyre and Royce are pragmatists is not an issue requiring discussion here. 17. Ibid., 16. 18. See Charles S. Peirce, “The Fixation of Belief,” Popular Science Monthly 12 (1877): 1–15. 19. Ibid., 256. 20. Ibid., 118 (emphasis in original). 21. Ibid., 257, 129. 22. Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), 4. 23. Ibid., 9 (emphasis in original). 24. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 144. [54.196.105.235] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 07:34 GMT) notes to pages 16–18 25. Ibid., 219. 26. Ibid., 144. 27. Ibid. As we will see, MacIntyre elaborates on the nature of virtues and vices. 28. Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty, 6. The Vanderbilt edition erroneously inserts the word “the” between “be” and “infinitely.” This word does not appear in the original pressing, and I have omitted it above. See Josiah Royce, The Philosophy of Loyalty (New York: Macmillan, 1908), 11. 29. While Royce does not explicitly conceive of life itself as a quest, he does explicitly invoke the term with some frequency. These two usages appear in consecutive paragraphs: “I indeed agree with the view that, in many ways, our traditional moral standards ought to be...