171 NOTES INTRODUCTION 1. The express goal of this book is to reveal what multidisciplinarity can reveal about fear that individual disciplines cannot. This agenda distinguishes it from other collections or journal issues on fear, such as Brian Massumi, ed., The Politics of Everyday Fear (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); Franz Bosbach, ed., Angst und Politik in der europäischen Geschichte (Dettelbach: J. H. Roll, 2000); Arien Mack, ed., “Fear: Its Political Uses and Abuses,” special issue, Social Research 71, no. 4 (Winter 2004); the project “Dealing with Fear” at Akademie Schloss Solitude, Stuttgart (2007–2009), http://www.dealing-with-fear.de/index.html; a thematic cluster on fear in the inaugural issue of Zeitschrift für Medien- und Kulturforschung , no. 1 (2009); and Michael Laffan and Max Weiss, ed., Facing Fear: The History of an Emotion in Global Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012). 2. See especially William M. Reddy, The Navigation of Feeling: A Framework for the History of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). While anthropology has produced the most vigorous antiessentialist emotions research, it is interesting to note that there are nearly no ethnographies of fear (or fear-like constructs). For an exception to the rule, see an article on precontact Maori fear of combat, Jean Smith, “Self and Experience in Maori Culture,” in Indigenous Psychologies: The Anthropology of the Self, ed. Paul Heelas and Andrew Lock (London, 1981), 149. 3. Lorraine Daston, oral communication, June 25, 2009; quoted with permission. 4. Jerome Kagan, What Is Emotion? History, Measures, and Meanings (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 14. 5. Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (London: John Murray, 1872), 362. In Darwin’s scheme, the emotion of fear was reduced to its corporeal signs, namely “trembling, the erection of the hair, cold perspiration, pallor, widely opened eyes, the relaxation of most of the muscles” (362). To Darwin, the greatest proof of its ancient, evolutionary heritage was that these outer markers obtained in all cultures (“With respect to fear, as exhibited by the various races of man, my informants agree that the signs are the same as with Europeans” [294]) and that primates showed many of them as well (“Monkeys also tremble from fear; and sometimes they void their excretions. I have seen one which, when caught, almost fainted from an excess of terror” [145–46]). 6. See, for example, Thomas Dixon, From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18–19, 22, 48, 60–61; Daniel M. Gross, The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s Rhetoric to Modern Brain Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 29; Katherine Rowe, “Humoral Knowledge and Liberal Cognition in Davenant’s Macbeth,” in Reading the Early Modern Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion, ed. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 181–82; and Nancy J. Chodorow, The Power of Feelings: Personal Meanings in Psychoanalysis, Gender, and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), esp. chap. 6. 7. The term “phobic regime” is inspired by Martin Jay’s notion of the scopic regime, as elaborated in his “The Scopic Regimes of Modernity,” in Force Fields: Between Intellectual History and Cultural Critique (New York: Routledge, 1993). 8. Kagan, What Is Emotion?, 1. A similar gesture permeates the writings of Antonio Damasio, whose best sellers enjoin readers to “look for Spinoza” by attending to the “feeling brain.” See Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Random House, 1994); and Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain (Orlando: Harcourt , 2003). 9. Kagan, What Is Emotion?, 216. Kagan’s injunction is in fact a modern update to an ancient precursor. As rhetorician Daniel Gross reminds us, Aristotle held that emotions such as fear, though often coded as “hardwired ,” are in fact instigated by “a series of enabling conditions obscured by our platitudes of biology.” Gross’s survey of the passions from late antiquity through the early modern era to the most recent regime of “brain science” 172 Notes to Pages 2–3 [3.15.147.53] Project MUSE (2024-04-17 22:24 GMT) leaves the concept of “basic emotions” impoverished indeed. See Daniel M. Gross, The Secret History of Emotion: From Aristotle’s “Rhetoric” to Modern Brain Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006), 2. 10. On Angstlust from a psychoanalytic perspective, see Michael Balint, Thrills and Regressions (New York: International...