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3. Counterfactual Conditionals
- University of Pittsburgh Press
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29 Belief-Contravening Supposition Imaginative impossibilities do not figure only in discourse but have even come to play an increasingly prominent part in modern art. But of course they are most prominent in discursive speculation and especially in the context of speculative suppositions where they have long played a prominent role—especially in matters of imaginative if-then hypothesizing. Surely things might have been very different. Caesar might not have crossed the Rubicon. Napoleon might never have left Elba. Surely we can reason sensibly from such straightforward contraryto -fact assumptions so as to obtain instructive information about the consequences and the ramifications of such unrealized possibilities . There can be little question that we can generally say something about “what would happen if” in such matters. Counterfactual conditionals of this sort have been a mainstay of speculative thinking for a long time. The Greek historian Herodotus (b. ca. 480 b.c.) rea- 3 Counterfactual Conditionals 30 Counterfactual Conditionals soned as follows: “If the Elesian winds were the cause of the Nile’s annual flooding, then other rivers would be affected in the same way (which they are not).”1 What we have here is a counterfactual conditional : an answer to a question that asks what would transpire if, where this antecedent is false—or judged to be so.2 Just as explanations answer “why” questions, counterfactual conditionals offer responses to “what if” questions. And, clearly, there are both falsifying and truthifying counterfactuals, respectively coordinated with the questions: If p (which is true) were false, then what? If p (which is false) were true, then what? Answering such falsifying and truthifying questions is the very reason for being of counterfactual conditionals. Such conditionals have been a mainstay of speculative thinking for a long time. And they arise over a wide range of subject matters, including the following: 1. Thought-experimentation in tracing through the consequences of a disbelieved proposition (this occurs both in common life and in technical contexts) 2. Explanation of how things work in general—even under conditionals not actually realized 3. The didactic use of hypotheses in learning situations 4. Contingency planning (in everyday life) 5. Games and make-believe of all kinds 6. Framing expressions of regret or encouragement 7. Reductio ad absurdum reasoning and especially per impossible proof (in logic and in mathematics) The psychology of counterfactual thinking is a large and fertile field for psychological investigation.3 However, our present concern is with the logico-conceptual aspect of the matter—that is, with the rationale of correct thought about these counterfactuals rather than the empirical question of how people generally do think about them. [3.94.99.173] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 11:47 GMT) Counterfactual Conditionals 31 Counterfactual issues accordingly play a prominent part in both scientificandincommon-lifethinking,andariseoveranenormously wide spectrum of applications, ranging from the most serious to the most frivolous of contexts. And there are many reasons why counterfactuals are important. For one, we can hardly claim that some account satisfactorily explains the occurrence of an event if we cannot establish counterfactually that were the account different that occurrence would not have happened. Only where counterfactuals are satisfactorily at our disposal can we lay claim to an adequate explanatory understanding of the actual facts, and since the 1990s philosophers have given much attention to the topic.4 Counterfactual conditionals pivot on suppositions seen as false—along the lines of “If Napoleon had stayed on Elba, the battle of Waterloo would never have been fought.” Such counterfactuals purport to elicit a consequence from an antecedent that is a belief-contradicting supposition, one that it conflicts with the totality of what we take ourselves to know.5 Such conditionals have antecedents that involve conflicts with our beliefs and not just mere supplementations to them. The result is a self-contradictory chaos, and distinctive new instrumentalities need to be provided to restore order. Supposition is, of course, a commonplace device that functions via such familiar locutions as “suppose,” “assume,” “what if,” “let it be that,” “consider the hypothesis that,” and the like. This sort of thing is closely connected with our topic since it affords the only other cognitive pathway to the domain of nonexistent possibility. Propositions in general—suppositions included—can be classed in three groups: 1. The factual: those we take to be true: (“Suppose that someone is presently walking on the Champs Élisées") 2. The undecided: those we neither accept nor reject: cognitively indeterminate theses considered neither definitely true nor definitely...