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6 THE “CL ASSIC” CASE IN PERSPECTIVE France and Germany from War to Union Much of the theoretical literature on the logic of commercial liberalism , especially its early roots, either builds upon or is inspired by the FrancoGerman transition to peace after the end of World War II. One of the goals of this book was to move away from the Eurocentric bias of that literature by examining the role of economic factors in transitions to peace in other regions of the world, especially the Middle East and East and Southeast Asia. This chapter now turns back to the allegedly classic case of commercial liberalism. Unlike the cases discussed in previous chapters, cooperative activities between the French and Germans began early in the transition to peace. Consequently, the sharp distinction made before between the stage of cold peace and the shift to normalization is less clear in this case. Economic considerations did play a crucial role in each state’s decision to invest in peace, since cooperation promised and delivered significant economic dividends for both countries. Even in this case, however, the role played by economic factors, especially in the early stages of the transition, was by no means the role envisioned by classic liberal economists. It was highly political, and it was manipulated and regulated by top decision makers in both countries. Consequently, it was the political economy behind the transition to peace that was important to examine, not a pure, apolitical, economic logic. The difficulty with this case lies in the fact that, in many ways, postwar Franco-German cooperation was overdetermined: economic incentives were intertwined with a strong and compelling geostrategic logic, given the new Soviet threat and the new American commitment to European security. Much has been written on these issues, but here I focus on the economic dimension. 133 Press-Barnathan CH6:Press-Barnathan CH6 3/31/09 2:52 PM Page 133 Compared to the cases discussed in previous chapters, the economic power disparities between the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and France were the narrowest, which should have a positive effect on the dynamics of cooperation . This case also demonstrates the need for a more complex understanding of the impact of economic power disparities. The French did not consider the economic disparities vis-à-vis the FRG in a political vacuum, and for a long time German economic power was seen as being balanced by France’s relative political power in Europe. A significant change in the economic power disparities developed in the 1970s, when the German economy showed impressive growth. The most dramatic change, of course, occurred in 1990, with the unification of Germany. This change provides a good test of the degree of “normalcy ” in the relations. As for the impact of third parties, the key outsider in this case was once again the United States, and indeed there has been much debate among international relations (IR) scholars regarding the central role of the United States in the pacification of Europe (meaning first and foremost the pacification of Franco-German relations). Still, the unique aspect of this case is the introduction, at a rather early stage of the transition, of regional multilateral institutions within which Franco-German relations came to be embedded (namely the European Community and later the European Union, as well as their joint membership since 1954 in a military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization). From Conflict to Peace France and Germany share an impressive and bloody legacy of historic rivalry. The unification of a group of German states under the king of Prussia was closely associated with their defeat of France in the war of 1870, which created in France the bitter legacy of territorial loss (the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine). Then came the unprecedented bloodbath of World War I (1914–1918). Finally, there was the deeply tragic history of World War II and the occupation of France by Nazi Germany.1 After World War II, the transition to peace between France and Germany took five years, from the defeat of Nazi Germany until the birth of the new state of the Federal Republic of Germany and its recognition by France. When the war ended and Germany was divided into four occupation zones, the initial French policy was to keep Germany weak and divided. The French sought to 134 the “classic” case in perspective Press-Barnathan CH6:Press-Barnathan CH6 3/31/09 2:52 PM Page 134 [18.116.63.174] Project MUSE (2024-04-23...

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