The ANC Youth League

6. The new rebellion, 2004–2012

120 6 The new rebellion, 2004–2012 In August 2004 Fikile Mbalula took over the presidency of the ANCYL. He had been secretarygeneral since 1998 and, though already 33, was the natural successor. With endorsements from the outgoing president, Gigaba, and most senior figures in the senior ANC, he was elected unopposed at the 22nd national congress. Throughout the rest of 2004 and into early 2005, Mbalula, though in style more populist and less intellectual than Gigaba, appeared to be an Mbeki loyalist who accepted the authority of the senior ANC. He supported Mbeki’s business-friendly economic policy and prominently rebuked the left alliance partners when they took issue with the ANC president. When a COSATU delegation was expelled from Zimbabwe in November 2004 for criticising the Mugabe regime, Mbalula was among the first to attack COSATU and defend Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’. 121 The ANCYL appeared to be maintaining its respectful loyalty towards the ANC leadership, especially in the wake of the ANC’s strong electoral victory in 2004. Then, quite suddenly in early 2005, in what William Gumede calls a ‘gravity-defying somersault’, Mbalula and the Youth League leadership turned against Mbeki and his leading faction in the ANC.38 At the same time, the Youth League threw its weight behind Jacob Zuma, the ANC’s beleaguered deputy president, whose presidential hopes seemed to be waning as the ‘arms deal’ corruption case of his associate Schabir Shaik dragged on in early 2005. evidence was mounting of a corrupt relationship between Shaik and Zuma, and by early 2005 Mbeki was distancing himself politically from his deputy. rumours abounded that Mbeki would replace Zuma as the Deputy President of the state and even consider standing for a third term himself as ANC president. Few expected Mbeki to attempt to change the Constitution in order to stay on as State President, but there was no legal obstacle to his retaining the party presidency, a position that would allow him to exercise enormous power and influence. It was in this context that an alliance started to take shape in support of Zuma. Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the Youth League’s turn-around is that it found itself on the same side as COSATU and the Communist Party. The left backed Zuma in 122 the (misguided) belief that he would follow a more socialist-inclined economic policy. On 31 May 2005 the ANCYL defied Mbeki by officially endorsing Zuma as the presidential successor. Shortly afterwards, Mbalula announced, almost unthinkably, that he would march alongside COSATU in a big impending national strike. In June, Shaik was convicted of corruption; in a hugely damaging judgment, Zuma and Shaik were found to have had a ‘generally corrupt relationship’. In response, Mbeki fired Zuma as Deputy President and replaced him with a handpicked loyalist, Pumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. The battle lines were drawn within the ANC. Over the following months the Youth League became the most vocal defender of Zuma and critic of Mbeki. Why did the ANCYL change direction? There is no clear-cut answer to this. There are a number of theories, none on its own entirely satisfactory, to explain the ‘somersault’. Could it have been about ideological differences? This seems very unlikely. The Youth League had an established record of anti-leftism; the leadership mostly approved of Mbeki’s brand of Africanism. In any case, there was no reason to believe that Zuma’s ideology was significantly different from Mbeki’s. If anything, the emerging alliance with the left seemed to suggest a possible shift away from Africanism under Zuma. Although the ANCYL 123 did have its own internal left faction, which heartily encouraged the new alliance, the faction had never been strong enough to shift the League’s direction. Some argue that the Youth League simply read the mood of the party, sensed that dissatisfaction was mounting against Mbeki’s aloof and centralising style of leadership, and positioned itself on the likely winning side. This was essential if the League was to continue to receive patronage from the senior ANC in future. There may be an element of truth in this, yet the League in many ways initiated the attack on Mbeki, and its support base was potentially strong enough to swing the contest behind either rival. It is possible that Youth Leaguers felt that their influence and potential upward mobility were too limited under Mbeki’s topdown leadership...