Ontology after Ontotheology: Plurality, Event, and Contingency in Contemporary Philosophy

Seven: The Ethos of Contingency

262 262 SEVEN The Ethos of Contingency “The negative knowledge of our mortality thus refers to the positive knowledge of our possible rebirth.” —Quentin Meillassoux, L’inexistence divine “Plato must himself resort...to myths, like the myth of Er the Pamphylian returning from the kingdom of the dead.” —Alain Badiou, Petit manuel d’inesthétique Throughout this study, I have argued that present-day philosophy is confronted with the task of answering the question of what ontology might be after ontotheology.1 As I have argued, the core of this ontotheological constitution of metaphysics is found in the principle of reason and its quest for a unifying ground, as Heidegger puts it. Thus, the expression “after ontotheology” delineates a precise task for philosophy, namely, to think being in such a way that it offers an alternative to the two motives that hold ontotheology together: the primacy of unity as well as the primacy of ground or reason. Despite the different conceptions of the theological motive in ontotheology, as well as of the concepts of plurality and event that offer an alternative to ontotheology, one might say that in contrast to the necessary, universal, and unifying ground, which is the culmination point of the principle of sufficient reason, the suspension of this principle is concerned with creating the concept of a contingent, singular, and pluralizing event. The Ethos of Contingency 263 In addition to the two axes of plurality and event offering alternatives to unity and reason, respectively, I have argued from the outset of this study that a third axis needs to be taken into account as well. The philosophical comportment or disposition to the necessary, universal , and unifying ground is the:oria. The inquiry into a contingent, singular, and pluralizing event requires another ethos of thought that allows it to think the event and its contingency. Throughout this study, I indicated different forms of this philosophical comportment. In this final chapter, I want to gather the most important results of this study in light of the questions that continuously accompanied my inquiries into plurality and event: what alternative comportment of thought do present-day ontologies introduce, and in which sense do they relate to the conceptions of the event to which they are related? DEDUCTIVE FIDELITY AND THE AFFIRMATION OF THOUGHT The so-called speculative school has made a major contribution to the question of ontology today. In this study, I only discussed two representatives of this school: Badiou and Meillassoux. Based on the results of the previous chapters and despite the differences between Meillassoux and Badiou discussed in chapter 5, the comportment of their ontological thought may in both cases be called “speculative.” Speculation is no longer the:oria or contemplation in the ancient metaphysical sense of the word since it does not explore or posit a unified ground as the ultimate cause and principle of reality. Yet, in other senses, speculation does inherit certain aspects of the old the:oria. This is why Badiou characterizes his own thought as “metaphysics without metaphysics,” as noted in chapter 1. Although the adjective “speculative ” probably does not have one univocal meaning when comparing its usage among its different representatives, it seems reasonable to say that based on the similarities between Badiou’s and Meillassoux’s accounts of thought, a thought is called speculative when it includes the following three dimensions. First, speculative thought uses mathematics as either the main model for thinking or as a science that contributes significantly to the development of philosophical questions. Both Badiou’s use of 264 Ontology after Ontotheology set theory to develop his ontology of multiplicities and Meillassoux’s use of probability theory to account for the stability of the laws from physics are examples of this. As argued before, it might be commendable—as Badiou does—to reconsider the role and the place of mathematics in opposition to the Heideggerian dismissal of mathematics. Yet, although this reappraisal of mathematics guides especially Badiou’s trajectory of multiplicity, event, and fidelity to develop an alternative to unity, ground, and the:oria, no intrinsic connection exists in general between the reappraisal of mathematics and the task to develop an ontology after ontotheology. Second, speculative thought has a taste for the absolute. I would interpret Badiou’s “metaphysics without metaphysics” exactly in this sense: speculative thought remains metaphysics in its quest for an absolute, albeit this absolute is no longer an absolute, highest being, as...