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Canal Diplomacy, 1902-1919 On the evening of 18November 1903, in WashingtonD,C, two figures bent over a desk to examine a document. At about 7 RM, John Hay, U.S. secretary of state, had invited Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a Frenchman representing the newly independent Republicof Panama, to sign a treaty they had both drafted. They read it, discussed some clauses, penned a few changes, and then signed it. Thus began the formal U.S.-Panamanian alliance. For the next three-quarters of a century that document would evoke criticism, anger, and sometimes violence from Panamanians; Americansstood by its terms, for the most part, insistingthat itwas a binding contract. Underits aegis the United States built and operated one of the great transportation facilities in the world: the Panama Canal. The Second Independence of Panama From the 18905 until the end of World War I, the United States rose in status from a regional to a world power. This rise took place in stages: growing influence throughout the hemisphere by means of the Pan-American movement; expansion of U.S. commercial rights in the Far East through the Open-Door notes; assertion of protectorate rights in the Caribbean basin during and after the Spanish-American War; and attainment of major-power status during the First World War, U,S, diplomacy in this era is sometimes labeled "imperialist" because of the acquisition of overseas territories (Hawaii, the Philippines , Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands)and the exercise of military dominion beyond its borders. The independence of Panama and the construction of the PanamaCanal were an integral part of the U.S, rise to power.1 By mid-1902 the Roosevelt administration had the legislation it 63 4 64 PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES needed to proceed with negotiations for building a canal in Panama. The Spooner Act, however, had set certain conditions on the president : he could only pay $40 million to the New Company; the canal was to have a six-mile-widezone in which to operate; the concession would be in perpetuity; and an agreement had to be reached within a reasonable time. Congress thus limited the scope of negotiations in important ways. The Colombian government expected to reap huge rewards from a canal built in its Panamanian province, but formidable obstacles worked against it. For one thing, rebellious Liberals controlled most of the Panamanian province throughout 1902, and the central government was unable to defeat them, For another, powerful interests in Paris, New York, and Washington conspired to deprive Colombia of her just rewards or even her isthmian province, And finally, public opinion in Bogota was running against an agreement with the United States, and politicians had become factious about canal matters in general, Conservative Jose Manuel Marroquin, who had seized power by a coup in 1900, had his hands full managingnegotiations in Washington , civil war in Panama, and politics at home. Marroqum was in no hurry to deal, He and most Colombians intended to force the New Company to pay for the right to transfer its concession to the United States. Another option was to nullify the 1904-10 extension of the New Company's concession, so that the works and equipment would become national property in only two years. Then a more lucrative deal could be struck with the United States. And of course Marroqufn had to stiffen his agents in Washington in order to secure the best terms possible in the treaty, Roosevelt, on the other hand, regarded the canal as his entree into the history books and his greatest reelection plank for 1904, and he pushed to reach a canal agreement with Colombia quickly. Negotiations began in early 1902, even before Congress had passed the canal legislation. The Colombian government did not provide consistent or reasonable guidance for its representatives in Washington, and behind [3.145.163.58] Project MUSE (2024-04-20 02:56 GMT) 65 Canal Diplomacy the scenes Bunau-Varilla and Cromwell were doing everything they could to protect the New Company's interests. Several treaty drafts were prepared and then abandoned due to disagreements between Washington and Bogota. Bunau-Varilla also began machinations in Panama/ where he urged prominent figures to pressure Bogota to conclude a treaty favorable to the New Company, He struck a note he knew would jar local sentiments : the politicians in Bogota might ruin this great opportunity to secure a canal in Panama, in which case the United States would build one in Nicaragua. In that...

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