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CHAPTER THIRTEEN The Way Forward Every new nuclear armed state will add to the risks of accidents or miscalculations as well as deliberate use of these weapons and may encourage more states to acquire nuclear weapons to avoid being left behind. —International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 2009 The world has changed. Lines are now blurred: lines between nations, regions, and peoples; lines between disciplines, tools and applications of chemistry, physics, and biology; lines between use of technologies for good or for evil. —U.S. National Academy of Sciences, 2010 In 2010, reflecting on the successes of the istc, the former director of a leading Russian nuclear research center bitterly condemned Russia’s impending withdrawal from the istc Agreement with the following assertion: “All Russian stakeholder agencies united in fighting against the istc. They were scared of the istc’s successful corruption-free system of allocations of research funds, without kickbacks. What if the country’s leaders suddenly realized that the same experience could be applied to other research projects? How would they then participate in the growing sales of Audis and Mercedes in the impoverished country?” Meanwhile, the possibility of dangerous consequences of misbehavior in laboratories in other countries raises new concerns as technical capabilities spread rapidly throughout a world torn by political and military disputes. The globalization of weapons-relevant technologies calls for continuing development of effective means for preventing misuse of dual-use expertise and for [236] chapter thirteen thwarting the assembly of primitive tools of terrorism. But it is a long and often opaque road from (a) policy statements by g8 governments urging nonproliferation and counter-terrorism efforts to (b) effective on-the-ground programs that constrain malevolent activities and enhance international security. NEVERENDING STRUGGLE WITH PROLIFERATION During the past two decades important institutions—from government agencies in Washington, Ottawa, Brussels, and Tokyo to international organizations headquartered in New York, Geneva, and Vienna—have given high priority to safeguarding dangerous material. They have underscored the following themes: • Destroy excess nuclear warheads, missiles, and launchers. • Dismantle facilities that produce components for weapons of mass destruction . • Lock down highly enriched uranium. • Collect abandoned radioactive sources. • Neutralize highly toxic chemicals. • Consolidate and protect especially dangerous pathogens. • Control exports of dangerous technologies. The significance of these actions is clear. The United States and its allies have devoted tens of billions of dollars to such efforts at home and abroad in recent years. These approaches will undoubtedly continue for the indefinite future. Let us hope, however, that officials who strongly support the safeguarding of such tangible items give comparable attention to constraining scientific innovation that creates the weapons of the world. Restraining the illicit activities of scientists who can provide the technologies for weapons is of no less importance than controlling the weapons components themselves. If nonproliferation efforts are to be effective, then the creators of weapons deserve as much attention as the protectors of the finished products. In short, a sharp focus on the expertise dimension of nonproliferation has been ready for prime time since the 1990s, and the istc has been on center stage until today. Finding room on the crowded stage of diplomacy for expanding the concept of responsible science is not easy. Still, the Moscow science center has managed to establish a critical niche in responding to a core proliferation problem, namely, the problem of hostile intent by technically skilled discontents with access to dangerous technologies. [3.131.110.169] Project MUSE (2024-04-20 00:22 GMT) The Way Forward [237] At the governmental level, policymakers must ensure that bureaucracies do not tolerate, deliberately or by neglect, illicit development or acquisition of technologies for destructive purposes. At the laboratory level, scientists must understand their responsibilities for preventing such activities and the possible personal consequences for failure to do so. Without the support of government officials and scientific experts, discontents will have great difficulty using advanced technologies to cause massive damage to society. In short, the istc has shined a bright light on the uncertain foundation of the road to peaceful coexistence in the high-tech world of tomorrow. Never before in history have the world’s scientists navigated along such a treacherous pathway of technological innovation—along a trajectory with many possibilities for huge positive or equally large negative impacts on the global community . The Moscow science center has illuminated the critical role of scientific know-how in determining the future of civilization. Most important, the center has repeatedly demonstrated that very modest investments...

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