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7 The “Liberal South” and the Central Tragedy of Southern Politics The Democratic party in Alabama has as its motto “White supremacy.” . . . [n]othing will wreck [it] quicker in this state than any effort . . . to abolish segregation. —Frank m. Dixon scholars have been almost uniformly optimistic, even sanguine, in their estimations of the innate liberalism of the new Deal and World War ii south. some of this sentiment is the function of rational estimates of genuine and deeply held liberalism in spots. yet much of it is also the product of wishful thinking. in fact, a good deal is the result of the rather uncritical acceptance of contemporary evaluations (and in some cases the momentary hopes) of the most complete, and thus unrepresentative, of the region’s liberals. What is even more remarkable is that of all the southern states, Alabama has been most consistently pointed to by both historians and activists as the most liberal state of the liberal south during the period. some awfully good scholars have taken this tack. Consider the estimation of Wayne Flynt, an excellent historian who has so often been correct about so much in his varied writings: by the 1960s Alabama had become a state that seemed to epitomize opposition to the federal government. but in the 1940s and 1950s no state congressional delegation did more to expand federal powers to assist the nation’s weakest and most vulnerable people. . . . several informal polls of house members voted the Alabama delegation the best of any state. The state’s congressional delegation was also one of the south’s most liberal. . . . The answer lay in the long tradition of political dissent and populist protest, especially in north Alabama. . . . The new Deal encouraged the formation of unionism and produced strong popular loyalties among [Alabama’s] small farmers, workers, even small businessmen. Federal patronage . . . further solidified reformers. . . . The 164 / Chapter 7 class-based liberalism of the 1930s and 1940s united black and white unionists who were experiencing common economic problems.1 other very skilled historians have rendered similar judgments. Patricia sullivan wisely acknowledged that the novel developments of the new Deal– World War ii era “did not make the liberalization of the region’s political structure inevitable.” The analysis did, though, exhibit considerable empathy with the optimistic view of the most committed wartime southern liberals and their reality of an essentially “liberal south.” it was a south replete with a genuine “liberal-labor realignment initiated by the new Deal.”2 A number of contemporary observers, the most thorough liberals the region had to offer, voiced optimism about the south’s liberalism during the 1940s. in retrospect it has been tempting for historians to interpret these moments of unguarded optimism as blanket statements as to the essential, enduring, and untapped liberalism of the region. For example, during the 1940s Alabama native Aubrey W. Williams, one of the most complete liberals to be found anywhere in the south, thought he saw a “bottom deep awakening . . . an unmistakable assertion of decency and a turning on people who live by exploiting hatred, religious bigotry, by trading in people’s prejudices and fears.” Fellow Alabamian Clifford Durr enunciated similar sentiments as did, briefly, the Florida novelist lillian smith.3 iowa native, U.s. vice president, and perhaps the age’s most prophetic liberal henry A. Wallace went further by declaring a “spirit of liberalism is abroad in the south.” his tour of the region as a presidential candidate four years later would do much to correct this misplaced optimism. in 1944 the Cio’s executive board under Philip murray approved support of the southern Conference for human Welfare as engaged in work to expose and express “the true liberalism of our great southern states.” even black sociologist Ralph bunche thought that southern whites were “slowly awakening to . . . the negro diversion” and realizing that there are “more pressing [problems] than the black one.”4 but no one went further than Clark Foreman and James Dombrowski of the sChW in their report on the south submitted to sidney hillman’s newly powerful Cio-PAC. For Foreman and Dombrowski, the reactionary south—the south of demagogy, conscience-free laissez-faire, and hidebound conservatism—was an illusion. “it spoke the loudest” because it had “the heaviest financial backing” and, thanks to a severely constricted ballot, “the advantage of a Congressional forum.” but this reactionary echo chamber was not real. it reflected perhaps 20 percent of the true south while the vastly more populous “silent south” remained...

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