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Notes Preface and Acknowledgments 1. President Nixon attempted to cloak his decision to reverse American policy vis- à-vis Indochina by stressing the importance of concluding the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) with the Soviet Union as well as establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. He was also deeply concerned about getting reelected. One of the unintended consequences of President Nixon’s maneuverings was the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive, a major campaign that included the attack on the provincial capital of An Loc. President Nixon’s subsequent resignation took him out of the game and the 93rd Congress, much addicted to self-serving pettifoggery, eventually succeeded in completing the process of gifting Indochina to the enemy. Chapter 1 1. Opinions on North Vietnamese strategic objectives are mixed and difficult to clarify as they undoubtedly changed as the offensive developed. Philip C. Clarke, “The Battle That Saved Saigon,” Reader’s Digest, March 1973, 151, cites an unidentified North Vietnamese source who named Saigon as the strategic objective while Orrin DeForest and David Chanoff, Slow Burn: The Rise and Bitter Fall of Ameri­ can Intelligence in Vietnam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 197–198, argues that North Vietnamese objectives were limited to seizing territory that would support their negotiations in Paris. Dale Andradé, America’s Last Vietnam Battle: Halting Ha­ noi’s 1972 Easter Offensive (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 25–26, provides a broader and more-calibrated range of North Vietnamese objectives. Chapter 2 1. Aeschylus, 525 B.C.–456 B.C., was a celebrated Athenian playwright recognized as the father of Greek tragedy. Many of his plays dealt with warfare, and as a veteran 176 Notes of the important battles of Marathon and Salamis, where he fought against the Persians , he was an acknowledged expert on the subject. Chapter 3 1. Stephen P. Randolph, Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 15–19, provides an analysis of the major operational problems associated with Lam Son 719 that influenced North Vietnamese planning relevant to the Easter Offensive. Chapter 6 1. Tran Van Nhut, An Loc: The Unfinished War (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2009), 108–109, describes other events unfolding in the vicinity of Chon Thanh that I was blissfully unaware of. 2. James H. Willbanks, The Battle of An Loc (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), 67. Chapter 7 1.Andradé, America’s Last Vietnam Battle, 340–341, provides an excellent introduction to Major General Hollingsworth. 2. Nhut, An Loc, 109. The incident is also mentioned by K. G. Mortensen, The Battle of An Loc: 1972 (Parksville, Australia: Gerald Griffin Press, 1996), 35. Chapter 12 1. Andradé, America’s Last Vietnam Battle, 393, states the 1st Airborne Brigade inserted on 13 and 14 April. Willbanks, The Battle of An Loc, 87, states the operation occurred on 14 and 15 April, dates that are confirmed by Corley, Binh Long Province Headquarters Daily Log. Chapter 13 1. Corley, Binh Long Province Headquarters Daily Log, records that “oilskin” (my call sign) was in contact with the enemy on 16 April. 2. Multiple sources agree that the main attack on the firebase started on 19 April. This account of the 6th Airborne Battalion’s fight and subsequent breakout is based on discussions and correspondence with Ross Kelly. Chapter 15 1. Corley, Binh Long Province Headquarters Daily Log, provides an on-the-spot account of the Airborne Ranger attack on 19 April. Their employment is also recorded [3.145.16.90] Project MUSE (2024-04-20 16:32 GMT) Notes 177 by both Nhut, An Loc, 129, and Lam Quang Thi, Hell in An Loc, (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2009) 152. Chapter 16 1. U.S. Air Force colonel (R) Tom Lebar, a B-52 aircraft commander during the Vietnam War and a veteran of numerous missions to An Loc, and Bill Carruthers, a FAC during the battle and a B-52 pilot later, provided the author with many of the specifics concerning the employment and armament of B-52D aircraft included in this vignette. B-52 bombloads were limited only by the capacity of the internal racks and wing hard points. The aircraft were aerially refueled as required, sometimes both on the way to and returning from their targets. Chapter 17 1. Andradé, America’s Last Vietnam Battle, 427–435, provides insight into the leadup to this major North Vietnamese attack from the American perspective, as well as how...

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