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30 / Value Pluralism and Moral Experience far from obvious that any such argument exists. In other words, as Gray puts it, “why should we seek to displace this datum of experience at the behest of any ethical theory” when “it is not as if such theories were themselves especially compelling ” (1996, 63)? The Dangers of Monism Moreover, not only does monism appear incoherent with our ordinary moral experience , it turns out that it can also be potentially dangerous to moral conduct itself. It is important to recall Oakeshott’s words here that “every moral ideal is potentially an obsession” and “too often the excessive pursuit of one ideal leads to the exclusion of others, perhaps all others; in our eagerness to realize justice we come to forget charity, and a passion for righteousness has made many a man hard and merciless” (1991, 476). Berlin puts the issue perhaps even more pointedly when he warns us that “the possibility of a final solution—even if we forget the terrible sense that these words acquired in Hitler’s day—turns out to be an illusion; and a very dangerous one. For if one really believes that such a solution is possible, then surely no cost would be too high to obtain it: to make mankind just and happy and creative and harmonious for ever—what could be too high a price to pay for that?” (1992, 15). In other words, monism or a belief in a single criterion of goodness or value can breed an extreme form of instrumental rationalism in which monist ends may be used to justify any means, however despicable . Indeed, the belief that “it is in principle possible to discover a harmonious pattern in which all values are reconciled, and that it is towards this unique goal that we must make” can lead not only to “absurdities in theory,” but also to “barbarous consequences in practice” (Berlin 1969, lv–lvi). In advancing these criticisms, Berlin was clearly thinking about the excesses of totalitarian Nazi and Marxist regimes of the twentieth century. However, we should not imagine that modern liberal regimes are somehow exempt from the pernicious effects of monism. Hampshire warns here, in particular, of the destructive effects of the utilitarian form of monism on moral conduct, commonly expressed in liberal cultures, where the monist good consists in the promotion of a maximum of human happiness. In his view, “the utilitarian habit of mind has brought with it a new abstract cruelty in politics, a dull, destructive political righteousness: mechanical, quantitative thinking, leaden loveless minds setting out their moral calculations in leaden abstract prose, and more civilized and more superstitious people destroyed because of enlightened calculations that have proved wrong” (Hampshire 1983, 85). With the American experience in Vietnam clearly in mind, Hampshire criticizes the utilitarian approach in government for “making rational calculation of consequences the sole foun- Value Pluralism and Moral Experience / 31 dation of public policies,” thereby “favoring a new callousness in policy, a dullness in sensibility, and sometimes moral despair, at least in respect of public affairs ” (95). Moral Conflict in Public Life The argument for value pluralism advanced here rests, then, on the incoherence of monism with our moral experience, as well as the potential dangers of monism . However, one may reasonably ask, while value pluralism may pose a philosophical problem for monist theories of ethics, just how serious a problem is it for public administration? After all, if conflicts among incommensurable ends are relatively rare, then, while they may make for a certain level of discomfort when they occur, they surely need not preoccupy us too much as public administration writers or practitioners. Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that this is the case and very good reason to believe that, in fact, value conflicts pervade much of the experience of those who work in government and public administration . Stephen Bailey, one of the few writers in administrative ethics who have specifically addressed this issue of moral conflict, wrote over four decades ago of “the morally ambivalent effect of all public policy” that arises because “an adequate response to any social evil contains the seeds of both predictable and unpredictable pathologies” (1964, 237). According to Bailey, “The bittersweet character of all public policy needs little further elaboration: welfare policies may mitigate hunger but promote parasitic dependence; vacationing in forests open for public recreation may destroy fish, wild life, and through carelessness in the handling of fire, the forests themselves. Unilateral international action...

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