First Day at Gettysburg: Crisis at the Crossroads

4. Reynolds Climaxes His Career

CHAPTER 4 Reynolds Climaxes His Career THE COMMANDER OF THE UNION LEFT WING WAS ANXIOUS TO march to Buford's assistance with the leading elements of Doubleday's First Corps. But before leaving Marsh Creek for Gettysburg early on the morning of July I, several duties occupied John Reynolds' attention . These he performed in his customary meticulous way. First he read to Doubleday the messages he had received in recent hours. Then Reynolds indicated to the First Corps leader the locations of the various units of the Army of the Potomac. Finally, he discussed the marching orders which these units had received, and pointed out their destinations for the day's movements. Only then did the Left Wing commander depart for the battlefield.1 Riding along the Emmitsburg road toward Gettysburg, Reynolds' trained military eye could not have escaped noting the strong Cemetery Ridge heights south of the town, and at this time he apparently formulated plans to keep the enemy away from these elevations until the remainder of the Army of the Potomac could arrive and concentrate on them.2 Upon entering Gettysburg, Reynolds met Peter Culp, a Union scout, at the Eagle Hotel. After briefly conferring with him about the developing situation, Reynolds asked Culp to direct him to Buford's headquarters at the Seminary.3 There had been tenseness at Federal cavalry headquarters west of Gettysburg during the early daylight hours on July I. Buford's troopers were being hard pressed by the superior Confederate numbers, and reinforcements were breathlessly awaited. Buford's signal officer had 36 been stationed in the cupola of the Seminary building, and was eagerly watching for the appearance of Reynolds and the infantry of the First Corps.4 When the signal officer shouted down the news of Reynolds' approach, Buford rushed up into the cupola to see for himself.5 At 9: 00 a.m., or a little thereafter,6 Reynolds rode up to the Seminary . Dismounting, he called up to Buford ,in the cupola, "What's the matter, John?" "The devil's to pay!" Buford replied to his friend and superior.7 Reynolds then asked Buford if he and his embattled cavalrymen could hold out until the infantry of Doubleday's First Corps could arrive. "I reckon I can," Buford answered.8 Reynolds then dispatched Captain Stephen Weld, an aide-de-camp, to General Meade with the following message, which the army commander received at I I: 20 a.m.: "The enemy is advancing in strong force, and I fear he will get to the heights beyond the town before I can. I will fight him inch by inch, and if driven into the town I will barricade the streets, and hold him back as long as possible." "Good!" exclaimed Meade. "That is just like Reynolds, he will hold out to the bitter end." 9 Other orders were sent by Reynolds to Doubleday to hasten to the front.10 Howard's Eleventh Corps was instructed to press forward with the utmost speed, and to move into position in reserve of N CONFEDERATE I UNION ~ r030am·,./lJIY,w_ -9 -E SCALE 6 \I. ~4 YZMILE S 37 the First Corps, which would arrive on the field before the Eleventh.ll Reynolds' decision to fight west of the town was a momentous one. It also happened to be the correct one. For the Federals to have fallen back in the morning to the heights just south of Gettysburg would have been disastrous, in all probability. The Confederate forces, superior numerically to the Union forces present, and being augmented faster than the Northern troops, would have had the better part of the day to drive the Federals from the Cemetery heights, which would then have been occupied by the Southerners. In this position, the better-concentrated Army of Northern Virginia would be at the apex of the three roads to the south of town upon which the more widelyscattered National army was approaching Gettysburg. Additional hours of daylight would have been available for the Confederates, and defeat in detail of the Federal forces would have been quite likely. Probably the entire result of the battle and campaign would have been different. Hence, it can be seen that Reynolds' decision to sacrifice, if necessary, his First Corps, and even the Eleventh, while taking as heavy a toll of Lee's soldiers as possible, was the wise and soldierly move to make. About 8...