First Day at Gettysburg: Crisis at the Crossroads

3. The Early Morning Fight of Buford

CHAPTER 3 The Early Morning Fight of Buford THE MOMENTOUS DAY OF WEDNESDAY, JULY I, 1863, DAWNED rainy and misty, with scattered showers prevalent across the countryside of southern Pennsylvania.1 However, as the morning advanced, the weather was to clear, the sun to come out, and the heat to become intense, with high humidity.2 Mter the fog and clouds had lifted, a blood-red sunrise, like the storied sun of Austerlitz, was noted.3 A gende wind was blowingfrom south to north.' General Lee, that morning, rode eastward toward Cashtown over the Chambersburg pike. He was accompanied by Longstreet. Despite the concern over the continued absence of Stuan's cavalry, and despite the dread uncertainty over the location of the Federal legions, Lee appeared to be composed and in good spirits.5 And why shouldn't he be? His orders for a concentration of the Army of Nonhern Virginia at Cashtown, later switched to Gettysburg by reason of Hill's precipitateness, were bearing fruit, and led to a fortuitous concentration at the latter point-a concentration "that has nothing to compare with it in the annals of modem war."6 "The time intervals were carefully adjusted as if the whole movement had been rehearsed." 7 The early morning of July 1 found Rodes' division, accompanied by corps commander Ewell, marching along the Arendtsville road by way of Middletown (Biglersville) for Cashtown-from which destination he was to be diverted later in the day to Gettysburg.8 Early's division of the Second Corps was supposed to follow on a parallel road by way of Hunterstown, Schrivers, and Mummasburg. But Early had :z6 learned that the Hunterstown road was rough and, exercising his discretion as division commander, moved his column to the Harrisburg road at Heidlersburg. From there he moved to Schrivers, and then headed toward the rendezvous at Cashtown (from which he was also to be diverted later in the day to Gettysburg).9 Meantime, on the Union side, caution still prevailed. Meade, at army headquarters at Taneytown, sent the following message at 7:00 a.m. to General-in-Chief Halleck: "The point of Lee's concentration and the nature of the country, when ascertained, will determine whether I attack or not. Shall advise you further today, when satisfied that the enemy are fully withdrawn from the Susquehanna." 10 This dispatch differed from Meade's earlier telegram which had stated that Gettysburg was indicated as Lee's probable point of concentration . Meade gave the positions of his various corps in the same message to Halleck, and acknowledged the receipt of Couch's earlier communications from Harrisburg, adding that "these movements [by the Army of the Potomac] were ordered yesterday, before the receipt of advices of Lee's movements." 11 Then, early on the morning of July I, Meade promulgated the following circular to his corps commanders: From information received, the commanding general is satisfied that the object of the movement of the army in this direction has been accomplished , viz, the relief of Harrisburg, and the prevention of the enemy's intended invasion of Philadelphia, etc., beyond the Susquehanna . It is no longer his intention to assume the offensive until the enemy's movements or position should render such an operation certain of success. If the enemy assume the offensive, and attack, it is his intention after holding them in check sufficiently long, to withdraw the [wagon ] trains and other impedimenta; to withdraw the army from its present position, and form line of battle ... [along] Pipe Creek ... . The time for falling back can only be developed by circumstances ... . [Here follows precise instructions as to how the units would move to the Pipe Creek position.] This order is communicated, that a general plan, perfectly understood by all, may be had for receiving attack, if made in strong force, upon any portion of our present position. Developments may cause the commanding general to assume the offensive from his present positions ....12 Meade's circular, describing a possible falling-back movement to the defensive line behind Pipe Creek, probably did not reach Reynolds 27 before the latter left Marsh Creek for Gettysburg.1s However, Meade sent out additional liberal orders to Reynolds directly on the heels of the above-mentioned circular-orders which gave the competent Left Wing commander considerable leeway and discretion in deciding how to meet the developing situation. These latter orders-a copy of which...