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PART II (Added m I926) 1 WHEN THE first edition of The Command of The Air was published ,l I thought it wiser not to express all my thoughts on the problems of aeronautics because I did not want to upset too violently the prevailing ideas on the subject. My purpose then was simply to break ground for the acceptance and execution of a minimum program which would have constituted a point of departure for further progress. In 1921 we had only an auxiliary air force-it could hardly be called even that-that is to say, some aerial means intended to facilitate and integrate land and sea operations. Notwithstanding the services rendered by the air arm during the war, it was really considered superfluous, especially in military circles. At that time if few paid attention to the needs of the army and navy, no one gave any attention to the needs of the air force. This being the case, it was a question at that time of bringing to notice the concept of the "command of the air," of giving a preliminary notion of its importance, of pleading for consideration of means better adapted to conquering the command of the air, of gaining acceptance or the idea of an air force independent of the army and navy. All this had to be done shortly after a major war during which the air force operated only as an auxiliary, and against the cherished convictions of all those-they were and are legion-who make ready for the future by looking at the past. This was dangerous territory; and, notwithstanding the semiofficial status given to The Command of The Air by its publication under the auspices of the Ministry of War, none of the high army 1 The first edition contained only Part I. Part II appeared for the first time in the second edition, published in 1927. 93 94 The Command of The Air and navy authorities deigned to concern themselves with the question , about which complete silence was preserved until the march on Rome. Then came a revolution which really provoked thought. Apparently the ideas expressed in Part I must have seemed doubtful , if not altogether insane, unless the indifference sprang from general congenital mental laziness. But had I not sacrificed much in permitting the retention of the auxiliary air force in order to propitiate the goddess of incomprehension? I had. In Part I I tried to make clear the essential importance of an independent aviation; but I made the admission that for the time being the auxiliary air force should be retained, though I was, and still am, convinced that one is incompatible with the other. This was a weakness on my part, I admit. But the things one must go through to make common sense prevail! For the rest, anyone who read Part I with attention must have understood perfectly that I considered auxiliary aviation worthless, superfluous} harmful. In the section on "Independent Air Force and Auxiliary Aviation ," after stating the conclusion: "An adequate national defense cannot be assured except by an aerial force capable, in case of war, of conquering the command of the air," I added: "We can see clearly how easy a time a well-organized enemy bent on conquering the command of the air would have, and how helpless these auxiliary aerial means employed by the army and navy would be, confronted by an enemy Independent Air Force bent on conquest." This means that an auxiliary air force is worth nothing if it does not succeed in conquering the command of the air. Now, in wartime an auxiliary air force is worthless; not only that, but harmful because its means could have been usefully employed in another way. In short, as I said in Chapter I, "Any effort, any action, any resources diverted from this essential aim (the command of the air) makes conquering the command of the air that much less probable; and it makes defeat in case of war that much more probable." Any diversion from this essential aim is an error. I considered it an "error" to keep an auxiliary air force which was incapable of conquering the command of the air, but I admitted its right to existence so as not to upset too violently those The Command of The Air 95 whose minds found it too great a leap to abolish the auxiliary air force, the only air force allowed then, and create an independent aviation, an innovation...
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