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To say that we are closer to victory today is to believe, in the face of evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. It seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. —Walter Cronkite, CBS Evening News, February 27, 1968 Phase II: The Tet Offensive Phase I of the “General Offensive, General Uprising” had met its objective of drawing U.S. forces away from the major population centers and into the remote mountains and borders of South Vietnam, especially the DMZ and Khe Sanh. According to the plan, the Viet Cong would have an easier time in¤ltrating South Vietnam’s major cities when the right moment came to initiate Phase II, the takeover of population centers and attacks on ARVN and U.S. bases and communications facilities. North Vietnam’s generals at the DMZ Front Headquarters had to be pleased. The entire 3d Marine Division was moving north. Major General Tompkins, commanding general of the 3d Marine Division, had relocated his division headquarters from Phu Bai to Dong Ha. As 1968 began, the Operation Kentucky area, which encompassed all of Leatherneck Square, was the responsibility of the 9th Marines. Defending Con Thien was 2/1; 1/4 held down C-2 and C-2 Bridge (C-2A); and 2/9 was at C-3 and C-3 Bridge (Cam Lo). Strongpoint A-3 at the Trace was defended by 3/3. Lieutenant Colonel Bendell’s 3d 17 After Tet Battalion, 4th Marines was moved from the Trace to Camp Carroll at the end of January, replacing the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines sent to Khe Sanh to bolster the 26th Marines in Operation Scotland. All of those moves were part of Operation Checkers. Battalions were hopscotched around in an effort to meet the recent threat posed by the large numbers of North Vietnamese forces moving into areas along Route 9 and around Khe Sanh and the Qua Viet. Tet Nguyen Dan, the lunar New Year holiday, came on the last day of January and was traditionally a happy time of celebration for the Vietnamese people. Tet was like our Fourth of July, Thanksgiving, and Christmas all rolled into one. The Viet Cong announced a countrywide Tet truce from January 27 until February 3. Following suit, the South Vietnamese also offered a Tet cease-¤re but only for thirty-six hours commencing on January 29. The I Corps was exempted from the cease-¤re altogether due to recent intelligence reports that large numbers of NVA were in¤ltrating southward into I Corps. The recent Christmas/ New Year’s truce ¤asco was still fresh in the minds of the Allies. Few had any great expectations that this new truce would last. On the night of January 29, any delusions of a Tet truce were rudely shattered. In a series of devastating strikes, ¤rst Da Nang was attacked, followed the next day by the ancient imperial capital of Hue, and then Quang Tri City. All major cities, provincial capitals, and district headquarters throughout South Vietnam were attacked by the NVA and Viet Cong during the Tet “truce.” The Americans, largely ignorant of Vietnam ’s history, had assumed Tet was a peaceful holiday. That was not always the case; in a famous battle in January 1789, the Viets defeated a Chinese army and drove it out of Vietnam during Tet. At 2:15 a.m. on February 2, the Cam Lo District Headquarters compound, located astride Route 9, was assaulted by two battalions of NVA plus a sapper company. The compound was defended by an understrength platoon of Marines—two squads from D/1/4 and a squad from E/2/9—and a Combined Action Program squad, a handful of combat engineers, some Popular Force Vietnamese, and a contingent of U.S. Army advisors. The enemy force was gunned down and blasted by artillery before they could penetrate the wire. At ¤rst light, a Marine armor/ 294 Kentucky [18.118.145.114] Project MUSE (2024-04-25 07:13 GMT) infantry counterattack from C-3 and Cam Lo Bridge routed the attacking force. The of¤cial body count was 111 NVA/VC killed and 34 captured . Corporal Larry L. Maxam from D/1/4 was awarded the Medal of Honor posthumously. The district’s deputy senior advisor, U.S. Army Capt. Raymond McMaken, said later, “The Marines just stacked them up on the wires. They were magni¤cent.”1 After...

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