In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

A depleted, battle-weary 1st Battalion, 9th Marines had been pulled out of Con Thien on July 13 and reassigned to Camp Carroll for rest and re¤tting. Replacing 1/9 at Con Thien was the highly regarded 3d Battalion , 4th Marines, who had distinguished themselves in World War II at Guam and Okinawa. They fought commendably in the 1966 battles at Mutter’s Ridge (where Capt. J. J. Carroll was killed tragically in a friendly ¤re accident) and Helicopter Valley and most recently in the battle for Hill 174. This proud battalion, nicknamed the “Thundering Third,” was next in line to serve their “time in the barrel” at Con Thien. Neither the Americans nor their South Vietnamese allies knew precisely what the North Vietnamese government was planning to do next. Dissent did exist among North Vietnam’s leaders at the highest levels. Some factions advocated a return to guerilla warfare while they sought an accommodation with the U.S., whereas the “hawks” pushed for an all-out, spectacular blow against the Americans. What is now known for certain is that some time in late June or July of 1967, at a meeting of the Lao Dong Party Politburo in Hanoi, the party called for a decisive blow against the Americans to force them to accept a military defeat. What ultimately came out of that meeting was the “General Offensive, General Uprising” plan, which would culminate in the 1968 Tet Offensive. Phase I was planned to commence in late August of 1967 and involve attacks on the periphery of South Vietnam along its borders and below the DMZ. This would draw U.S. forces away from the population centers . Phase II called for major battles with the Americans that would 10 The “Thundering Third” Con Thien, Fall 1967 [3.141.41.187] Project MUSE (2024-04-19 05:28 GMT) weaken their resolve. Phase III was the longed-for “uprising of the oppressed masses in the South” (Khnoi Nghai) against the Americans and their puppets in Saigon. The people would then throw out the defeated Americans and demand reuni¤cation of the two Vietnams into one nation. In I Corps, Phase I began with stepped-up pressure on Con Thien in late August and September. Allied intelligence was in the dark as to Hanoi’s far-reaching motives. Most analysts logically assumed that the creation of the NVA DMZ Front and its focus on Con Thien and Gio Linh was due to the SPOS barrier activity there. However, one farsighted Marine general, Victor H. Krulak, deduced that what the NVA were really up to was drawing the Marines’ attention away from the populated coastal areas into more advantageous battle¤eld sites in remote areas below the DMZ. But Krulak was a voice in the wilderness, not given a serious ear at either MACV or the White House.1 At that point in the war, Allied efforts in northern Quang Tri Province were dedicated to completing the SPOS barrier regardless of the costs. We would refuse to alter that course of action for another full year, no matter what anyone believed motivated the North Vietnamese Army to go on the offensive below the DMZ. If one of the goals of the General Offensive, General Uprising was to take over the two northernmost provinces in South Vietnam, Quang Tri and Thua Thien, then it made good tactical sense to continue to test the dominant military force in the region, the U.S. Marines. General Giap would resort to his preferred method—trial and error—to learn how the Marines would respond to large-scale attacks by his ground forces and vaunted artillery. The 3d Battalion, 4th Marines at Con Thien would be next in line to face this test. Dyemarker On June 18, III MAF published Operation Plan 11-67, which outlined the SPOS concept. The ¤rst phase consisted of widening the Trace between Con Thien and Gio Linh to six hundred meters; installing a linear obstacle system along the Trace, including mines, radar, towers, barbed wire, and sensors; and constructing four strongpoints and three The “Thundering Third” 167 base areas. Also, Routes 1, 9, and 561 would be improved, and Dong Ha would develop a storage site for construction materials. The ARVN would complete strongpoints A-1 and A-2 and base area C-1. The target date for completion of this ¤rst phase was November 1, 1967. The ¤nal phase was planned to begin when the monsoon season ended the...

Share