Ambitious Rebels: Remaking Honor, Law, and Liberalism in Venezuela, 1780-1850

Chapter Six. Liberalism Without a Loyal Opposition: The Elite Consensus Cracks, 1830's-1840's

186 chapter six Liberalism Without a Loyal Opposition The Elite Consensus Cracks, 1830s–1840s In the preceding chapters, we have considered the evolution of political and legal institutions and the culture of honor as well as how liberals came to dominate Venezuelan politics. The remainder of the book will explore the destruction of the Conservative Oligarchy, a term that refers to the regime that governed from 1830 to 1848. This story includes several intertwined narratives: oscillating commodity prices and deregulated credit markets caused economic troubles, which in turn catalyzed political tensions ; the consensus among liberal elites ended as they split over economic policies and formed two political parties, the Liberals and the Conservatives ; the rural poor rose in rebellion against the Conservative Oligarchy and attempted to ally with the Liberal Party; the violence between classes and between elite factions weakened republican institutions and gave rise to sovereign Venezuela’s first authoritarian regime. This chapter focuses on how political discourse exacerbated the rupture among elites. The next chapter will examine why the poor rebelled and how the uprising helped to destroy the Conservative Oligarchy and usher in a new regime. In large part, this chapter explores how the elites managed an economic crisis as revealed through debate in the press, and shows that they lacked a political culture that could manage this level of political stress through liberal paradigms. The chapter will first provide a brief description of economic and policy conditions, the formation of political parties, and the path to rebellion. The investigation will then explore the debate over these economic and political troubles within the press. Though all sides Liberalism Without a Loyal Opposition • 187 espoused the value of a free press, they had not embraced the notion of loyal opposition and therefore described opponents as traitorous enemies. In the absence of a cultural acceptance of loyal opposition, public discourse in the press did not protect liberty or create a healthy public sphere but rather delegitimized the state. Discourse among elites, therefore, reveals how the country’s institutions (e.g., free press, elections, and political parties) adopted liberal paradigms more rapidly than had the political culture . In the words of historian José Gaos, “The forms of political organization will change considerably faster than will customs and moral ideas.”1 Commercial-Financial Power and Deregulated Credit Laws The intense disagreement over financial policy that occurred is somewhat surprising given that most elites and the government embraced the rise of commercial power and an orthodox version of liberal economics (capitalism ) that promoted contract, free trade, and minimal governmental intervention in the economy. These policies gained legitimacy through a rapid expansion of trade and exports (see figures 1.2–1.4). As Vice President Diego Bautista Urbaneja said in his 1833 report to Congress, “There is nothing more just than allowing each person the possibility to engage and dispose of his goods freely, because there is nothing more certain than that nobody will be more wary, long-sighted, and interested than this same person in determining and calculating with relation to his obligations.”2 Putting action to these sentiments, Venezuela endeavored to open its market and prosper through transatlantic trade. In 1829, Venezuelans formed the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País in order to facilitate communication, educate the public on economics, and promote free market policies. To foster foreign investment, the 1830 Constitution (Article 211) guaranteed the payment of foreign debt. As Bolívar had said, “The national debt . . . is the deposit of Venezuela’s faith, honor, and gratitude .”3 Between 1830 and 1845, the Treasury allocated 37 percent of state revenues to pay down the government’s loans, thereby establishing strong credit both domestically and with foreign investors.4 One of numerous obstacles to economic recovery after independence was the scarcity of credit. In 1833, Antonio Leocadio Guzmán, the Secretary of the Interior and Justice, described the troubles that caused lack of principal for loans: “It is well known that we possess abundant fertile land, and that our principal wealth comes from agriculture; but what we don’t 188 • Chapter Six have is sufficient capital to give it the impulse that will make it extensive, flourishing, and remarkable.”5 The typical creditors from the colonial period (Spanish merchants and financiers, wealthy Venezuelans, and the Church) no longer had sufficient capital, and the money from incoming foreign loans mostly went to the government rather than to individuals...