Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense

Preface to the Paperback Edition

xi We completed Defending America shortly after George W. Bush assumed the presidency. Since then, several major events have occurred—most notably, the terrorist attacks of September 11 and President Bush’s December 2001 decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. What impact do these events have on our conclusions? Some of the particulars of our argument have been overtaken by events. The demise of the ABM Treaty, coupled with the muted reaction from Moscow, means that the proposal we make in chapter 6 for renegotiating the treaty is obsolete, at least for now. September 11 dramatically altered the politics of missile defense in the United States. During the summer of 2001 a serious confrontation had been brewing between the Republican White House and the mostly Democratic critics of missile defense. Both sides seemed to see an opportunity to advance their policy preferences and score political points. After the attacks on New York and Washington, criticism of the White House’s missile defense policies, like its handling of defense and foreign policy more generally, evaporated. For the next year or so at least, Bush will face little opposition to his missile defense proposals. Nonetheless the basic argument of our book still stands—a limited long-range missile defense capability that can defend the United States and its allies against attack by hostile emerging ballistic missile states Preface to the Paperback Edition makes sense, but such a defense should be developed and deployed with every effort to allay Russia’s and China’s security concerns. Indeed, the events of the past year reinforce several of our broad themes. First, it is prudent to take steps, including missile defense, to protect ourselves against the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. The Central Intelligence Agency released a National Intelligence Estimate in December 2001 that reaffirms chapter 3’s description of an emerging, though not rapidly spreading, ballistic missile threat. Moreover, September 11 demonstrates that we live in a world in which some of our adversaries will inflict catastrophic harm on us if they can. This is not to say that proliferation cannot be stemmed. It can. In the past countries have been persuaded to “de-proliferate.” Nor is it to say that ballistic missile attacks are likely. They are not. But the spread of missile technology makes such attacks conceivable, and if missiles carry weapons of mass destruction, the resulting death toll could easily dwarf what we saw in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. Second, missile defense is not a panacea for American national security . September 11 shows that our enemies do not need ballistic missiles to inflict grievous harm on us. Indeed, while ballistic missile attack is potentially one of the most devastating threats to American security, it is also one of the least likely. For that reason, as chapter 6 argues, work on missile defense should not derail efforts to strengthen the ability of the U.S. Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the intelligence community, and other government agencies to detect and stop efforts to smuggle bombs into the United States. Washington should also deploy defenses against shorter-range and cruise missile defenses as events warrant and technology permits. It would be a mistake to lavish money on defenses against intercontinental missiles while shortchanging spending on programs designed to remedy other, more easily exploited, vulnerabilities. Third, the technology for shooting down long-range ballistic missiles under real-world conditions remains a hope. It is not yet a reality. When Bush took office, he discovered that the state of technology is just as chapter 4 describes it: the Pentagon had only one program under way that was dedicated to shooting down long-range missiles, and that system was still early in development. The Bush administration is now exploring an array of other technologies, and in part argued, not entirely convincingly, that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was necessary so that the Pentagon could test all technological possibilities. Nonetheless, it will take years if not decades to go from initial concepts to operating systems. xii PREFACE TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION Fourth, any potential missile defense deployment must take into account how other major powers are likely to react. President Vladimir Putin’s restrained reaction to President Bush’s decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, while admittedly of some surprise to us, does not mean that Moscow will be indifferent to any and...