Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense

Chapter Six: Missile Defense and American Security

142 Should the united states build a national missile defense? Critics have advanced many thoughtful arguments for saying no: the threat to the United States comes from only a handful of countries, most of which are probably not now close to having operational intercontinental missiles ; the United States cannot yet build a fully functioning NMD system; enemies could attack the United States in ways that do not require longrange missiles; and NMD could jeopardize arms control and related efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction program intended to secure nuclear warheads and materials within Russia. But in the end five facts stand out. First, ballistic missile technology, including long-range missile technology, is spreading to more countries. It is possible that Iran, Iraq, or North Korea will acquire the ability to strike the United States in this decade, perhaps having given little advance warning of its ability to do so. Second, the technology for shooting down enemy missiles is no longer the stuff of science fiction—particularly when matched against the small long-range missile arsenals that countries such as Iraq, Iran, or North Korea could plausibly develop in the years ahead. Improved sensors, computers, and rocket technologies should soon make it possible to carry out high-reliability intercepts without the use of nuclear weapons. Third, the end of the cold war creates the opportunity to rethink the role of missile defense in U.S. security policy and in U.S.-Russian relations . As we argue later in this chapter, there should also be ways to mitiMissile Defense and American Security CHAPTER SIX gate China’s most serious concerns about U.S. NMD—even if it does not prove possible, or necessary, to address all of Beijing’s concerns. Fourth, the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is nearly the only type of threat against which the United States has absolutely no defense today. Those who claim that an enemy “suitcase bomb” could circumvent any national missile defense often forget that the country already has several lines of possible defense against such weapons, including its intelligence services, Coast Guard, and customs agency. They also exaggerate the ease of building small, easily concealed nuclear weapons and overstate the ability of a foe to quickly gain coercive power from such weapons during a crisis or war. Finally, nuclear deterrence, while reliable in most circumstances, may fail in certain types of crises or conflicts. For example, if in a future war caused by Iraqi or North Korean aggression, the United States and its allies elected to overthrow the offending regime, occupy its country, and reform its political institutions—similar to the successful approach of allied forces in World War II—the regime in question might threaten or even carry out an attack with weapons of mass destruction in an effort to save its skin or as a last-ditch act of defiance. Deterrence cannot be expected to work under such circumstances, since the threatened regime would already be facing annihilation even if it did not use WMD against the United States. And the prospect that deterrence might fail could weaken American resolve to respond to a crisis or shake the confidence that U.S. friends and allies have in American security guarantees—possibly even leading some to consider developing their own nuclear weapons. Ultimately, there is no compelling reason for the United States to stand defenseless before the world, vulnerable to any and all missile attacks— and hence potentially less willing to defend its global interests and allies out of fear that doing so could make its population vulnerable to catastrophic reprisal. And it is difficult to believe it cannot find an approach to deploying NMD that will address the reasonable security concerns of Russia and China. Of course, missile defense will not be a panacea for American national security. No NMD system will protect Americans against nuclear suitcase bombs—more accurately described as truck bombs or ship-based bombs, given that they would generally be quite large. Nor will a system address the threat from governments or terrorists using ships or possibly even the territory of nearby countries to launch cruise missiles or shorter-range ballistic missiles at the United States.1 Washington should continue efforts MISSILE DEFENSE AND AMERICAN SECURITY 143 to strengthen the ability of the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, and the intelligence community to detect and stop efforts to smuggle bombs into the...