Opportunity 08: Independent Ideas for America's Next President

Chapter 8: Waning Chances for Stability: Navigating Bad Options in Iraq

SUMMARY Iraq is a failed state ensnared in a civil war. About 2 million refugees have fled the country, and another 2.2 million people have been displaced internally. The war has taken thousands of American lives and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. What started as a war with a clear enemy has spawned regional instability, transnational terrorism, risks to global oil supplies—and it has bolstered a nuclear-aspirant Iran. Initially, Washington insisted that the problems of Iraq were merely a problem of terrorism, and later of terrorism and an insurgency. However, pulling Iraq out of its nosedive will require the United States to confront the far more difficult problems of Iraq as a failed state and of Iraq in civil war. Historically, rebuilding the political, economic, and bureaucratic institutions of a failed state requires time, commitment, and a secure environment . Ending a civil war requires a negotiated settlement among the warring parties. Addressing both these Iraqi realities—a civil war and a failed state—will be necessary for changes in military tactics and augmented troop strength to create conditions for lasting progress. Four options frame the universe of possibilities facing this—and the next—administration: victory, stability, withdrawal, and containment. Victory, as defined by President Bush, is not currently attainable. Stability would concentrate on stopping the fighting, dismantling al Qaeda in 96 Waning Chances for Stability Navigating Bad Options in Iraq CARLOS PASCUAL AND KENNETH M. POLLACK 8 Waning Chances for Stability 97 Iraq, and forging a broad, short-term political agreement that could bridge the way either to real recovery at some later date or to containment if a truce among Iraq’s warring parties proves unsustainable. Withdrawal would most likely lead to a catastrophic, wider war. Containment is, ultimately, the least bad option if stability proves out of reach. Containment requires regional diplomacy under UN leadership, the creation of safe havens and buffer zones protected by international forces. We argue against the imposed partitioning of Iraq, unless the partition is a political compromise negotiated among the Iraqis themselves. The next president must ensure that diplomacy leads our policy in Iraq—first to pursue a political settlement and, if that fails, to reestablish wider international engagement to contain regional and global consequences. Without a political settlement, military action in Iraq is unsustainable. CONTEXT The January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq presented a stark picture of a shattered nation beset by terrorism, crime, an insurgency, a failed state, and civil war. To succeed, U.S. policy toward Iraq must come to grips with all of them—a daunting challenge. A Failed State and Civil War Historically, rebuilding the institutions of a failed state takes time, commitment , and a secure environment. The United States, which itself took more than three years to disburse the $18 billion that was appropriated for reconstruction in 2003, can hardly expect a dysfunctional Iraqi state to meet U.S.-imposed benchmarks. History shows that ending a civil war—as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Congo, Mozambique, and Northern Ireland—requires a negotiated settlement among the warring parties. At this writing, the absence of a realistic plan to craft a negotiated peace settlement, the difficulty of making any such plan work under existing circumstances , and the weakness of preparations to build Iraqi political and economic institutions dim long-term prospects for success. Sectarian Splits Iraq’s sectarian war engages Sunni and Shi’ite militias, al Qaeda operatives , and potentially the Kurdish peshmerga. Shi’ite militias—especially Muqtada al-Sadr’s Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM, or Mahdi Army) and the Badr Organization associated with the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC)— 98 CARLOS PASCUAL AND KENNETH M. POLLACK dominate Iraq’s weak government, running ministries as graft-ridden patronage networks. At the same time, exploiting the absence of a capable central government, the militias appeal to civilians by providing protection against crime and violence and basic services—food, medicine, money, employment, gasoline, and electricity. There are important splits among the Shi’a. JAM seeks a strong, Shi’acontrolled central government. It viciously extracts revenge for Sunni attacks and opposes a division of Iraq. By contrast, SIIC favors decentralized power and a strong Shi’ite-dominated nine-province region in the south. SIIC appears content to allow the Sunnis and Kurds to go their own way, although on terms unacceptable to Sunnis. Both the Mahdi Army and Badr Organization have infiltrated the police, to the...