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2: Spending Power and the Election-Driven President
- Brookings Institution Press
- Chapter
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2 Spending Power and the Election-Driven President 11 The president derives little if any spending authority from the U.S. Constitution . In fact, Article I specifically empowers Congress to appropriate funds, and scholars often note that the legislative branch has “the power of the purse.” However, each year Congress delegates spending authority to the executive branch. It relies on the president to do what legislators and their staff cannot: allocate hundreds of billions of dollars across hundreds of federal programs and policy areas to help meet citizens’ needs and desires. Congress can limit executive branch discretion by writing restrictions into legislation, developing formulas to determine distribution, creating block grants, and inserting earmarks into legislation. But it must delegate its spending authority because of its own resource constraints. Even if Congress preferred to make every federal distributive decision throughout the nation, lack of time, expertise, and staff requires that the federal bureaucracy take on much of that responsibility. When Congress does delegate spending power to the executive, it expects responsible action. Louis Fisher noted in 1975 that “a customary congressional control has been to delegate broad discretionary authority, confining that discretion by a combination of statutory guidelines and a trust in the integrity and good faith of executive officials.”1 However, because presidents and their appointees are political actors who have their own interests, that good faith can often be strained. The result is a conflict between 1. Fisher (1975, p. 259). 02-2520-6 ch2.indd 11 1/8/14 4:00 PM 12 spending power and the election-driven president Congress’s need to delegate authority and desire to reap political and electoral benefits that the executive branch also covets. The battle for discretionary spending power is not a ceremonial or ideological fight over what is right. It is a political conflict that has serious implications for policy and the electoral benefits reaped from policy. Fisher described those consequences and their magnitude, arguing that “unless Congress strengthens its control over budget execution, it cannot legislate back to reality its vaunted ‘power of the purse.’”2 Moreover, with the power of the purse also comes the power of pork, and presidents seek it out just as aggressively as legislators. The Federal Grants Process: An Overview Federal spending is a complex tool of public policy regulated by various formal and informal administrative procedures often developed and implemented in the federal bureaucracy. Lack of uniform procedures makes it difficult to design a single visual representation of the process or to detail the manner in which grant programs are administered. However, the federal grant process generally has four stages. First, grant programs are designed and developed. Second, the programs are made public and prospective applicants are invited to seek funds. Third, applications for funds are evaluated and accepted or rejected. Fourth, grant programs allocate funds to eligible applicants. Designing a Grant Program The conception and design of federal grant programs may involve the input of several actors and institutions. Because Congress authorizes spending and appropriates funds, it can play a role. Its influence, though limited, can extend even to federal discretionary grants, particularly at the design stage. A look at the text of federal law demonstrates the variation in discretionary authority. Some legislative language gives the executive branch broad discretion over the distribution of grant money. For example, in the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Congress authorizes and appropriates to the Department of Justice “$178,000,000 for discretionary grants to improve the functioning of the criminal justice system, to prevent or combat juvenile delinquency, and to assist victims of crime.”3 Such broad discretion gives the Department of Justice great leeway to design a program as it sees fit. Congress often authorizes distributive programs in this 2. Ibid., p. 260. 3. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, P.L. 111-8, 123 Stat. 524, March 11, 2009, p. 580. 02-2520-6 ch2.indd 12 1/8/14 4:00 PM [35.168.113.248] Project MUSE (2024-03-29 08:28 GMT) spending power and the election-driven president 13 way, delegating substantial authority to the bureaucracy under the heading of broad policy goals. However, Congress can also insert specifics into authorization and appropriations legislation that restricts discretion. In the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010, Congress appropriates $600,000,000 to the Department of Transportation but includes a number of conditions for its use: That the Secretary of Transportation shall distribute funds provided under this heading as discretionary grants to be...