Still Ours to Lead: America, Rising Powers, and the Tension between Rivalry and Restraint

Chapter Seven: Competitors, Not Cold Warriors: U.S.-China Relations

chapter seven competitors, not cold warriors U.S.-China Relations 151 In September 2010 a Japanese coast guard ship collided with a Chinese trawler that it was chasing from the waters surrounding an island chain known to the Japanese authorities as the Senkaku chain and to China by the name Diaoyu. Japan detained the Chinese trawler captain, and China retaliated by halting sales to Japan of rare earth materials, which are vital to high-tech industry. In April 2012 the hard-line governor of Tokyo started negotiating to buy some of the Senkaku Islands from its private owners, the Kurihara family. To preempt the governor’s move, the Japanese central government bought several of the islands. This infuriated China. Chinese and Taiwanese fishing convoys entered the waters at various points over the summer and fall, in each instance provoking Japanese reactions. In December a Chinese surveillance aircraft entered the airspace over the islands, and Japan scrambled eight F-15s in response. In January 2013 multiple Chinese aircraft entered the islands’ airspace. And in February, according to Japan, a Chinese frigate locked its fire-control radar onto a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force ship—an allegation that China denies. In the West, politicians and analysts alike reacted with alarm. There are two worries. First is a Japan-China clash, which could result from the dispute over the islands escalating, possibly through an accident. Second, and even worse because of America’s treaty obligations to defend Japanese -administered territory, a Japan-China clash could pull the United 07-2512-1 chap7.indd 151 1/8/14 3:50 PM 152 Of Rivalry and Restraint States into active conflict in Asia. A Financial Times editorial warned, “The shadow of 1914 falls over the Pacific”; several opinion pieces and essays warned of mounting risks; and in a widely read foreign policy blog a long essay was titled, “Eve of Disaster: Why 2013 Eerily Looks Like the World of 1913, on the Cusp of the Great War.”1 And this is just one part of a rising chorus of concern about the situation with China. One prominent international relations professor calls the situation “The Gathering Storm,” warning of a mounting Chinese challenge to U.S. power in Asia. The U.S. Department of Defense points with increasing concern to the pace of China’s cyberpenetration of the United States, both for purposes of intellectual property theft and to position itself to weaken U.S. command and control systems in the event of war. The U.S. Navy is increasingly perturbed by Chinese military investments in sophisticated weapons systems designed for one purpose only: to deny the U.S. Navy access to the waters off of China’s long coastline, waters long dominated by U.S. ships. Politicians on both sides are warning of a new cold war.2 Will the changing balance of power lead to war, perhaps a new cold war, between the United States and China? The relationship certainly has rapidly deteriorated. During the election that brought President Obama to office, there was a lot of discussion about the possibility of a new arrangement for global leadership, a U.S.-China condominium—in shorthand , a G-2.3 But instead the United States is in an active arms race with China in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. But there are important exaggerations here, as well—exaggerations about the likelihood of worst-case scenarios and about time lines. Automatic conflict between rising and falling powers is too readily assumed. China would confront many obstacles should it try to mount a strategic challenge to the United States or to U.S. leadership of the international system. Even if the size of the Chinese economy overtakes that of the United States, the huge remaining gap in per capita income will persist, as will other disparities in capacity (see chapter 1.) And since a peak of harsh rhetoric in 2012, in the run-up to the U.S. elections and the transition of Chinese leadership, cooler heads have been in evidence. The two countries have started a genuine discussion about forging a “new type of great power relations.”4 But hanging over even 07-2512-1 chap7.indd 152 1/8/14 3:50 PM Competitors, Not Cold Warriors 153 that optimistic formulation is this basic question, posed by the troubled history of power shifts: Does the rise of a new...