The Road to War: Presidential Commitments Honored and Betrayed

9. The Israel Model: Unprecedented and Unpredictable

199 chapter nine “Israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone.” Lyndon B. Johnson, 1967 THE ISRAEL MODEL Unprecedented and Unpredictable If the U.S. relationship with South Korea has been based on a mutual defense treaty, buttressed by the presence of 28,500 troops and backed until 1991 by nuclear weapons, and if the U.S. relationship with South Vietnam was based on a string of solemn presidential commitments and a joint resolution of Congress , then one might imagine that the U.S. relationship with Israel, so central to American foreign policy in the Middle East, would be based on at least a mutual defense treaty, joint resolutions of Congress, and perhaps even the stationing of large numbers of American troops in or around Israel. But that is not the case. The U.S.-Israeli relationship is based primarily on private presidential letters to Israeli prime ministers, containing commitments that are often honored but sometimes betrayed. There are other factors, too, including strong, overlapping political, religious, and cultural ties. Indeed, as journalist Peter Grose observed, “Americans and Israelis are bonded together like no two other sovereign peoples.”1 But, when it comes to matters of national security—when Israel’s fate may hang in the balance, or America’s interests may be directly threatened—neither country can turn to a binding mutual defense treaty, or a joint resolution of Congress, to find sanctioned reassurance of what each can expect from the other. For example, no matter how often the United States and Israel have conferred about Iran’s nuclear program, Washington can never be certain about Israel’s next step: will Israel go out on its own and strike Iran, immediately affecting America’s national interest? Unlikely, but possible. Nor can Israel rest comfortably in the belief that the United States will definitely live up 200 The Israel Model: Unprecedented and Unpredictable to its word about never allowing Iran to develop nuclear weapons. A president can always change his mind. And, deepening this uncertainty is the personal chemistry between an American president and an Israeli prime minister. Is there genuine trust between the two leaders, especially important when both must depend in the final analysis on their private correspondence? Between President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, trust has been a commodity in short supply. They both depend on an exchange of private and personal letters, a truly unique relationship. Is that enough? One Specific Example of a Presidential Commitment On the night of September 1, 1975, a remarkable day in the history of U.S.Israeli -Egyptian relations, a private letter from President Gerald Ford to Yitzhak Rabin was delivered late at night to the prime minister’s office in Jerusalem . It spelled out a number of secret American commitments to Israel’s security, without which Rabin would not have initialed the second Disengagement Agreement between Israel and Egypt earlier in the day. The letter seemed to have the power and authenticity of a formal bilateral defense treaty.2 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger bought Rabin’s agreement with unprecedented promises of American aid, arms, and assurances of diplomatic support . He negotiated as the president’s personal agent, both believing that the agreement served America’s national interest. Congress was not consulted, though Kissinger assumed Congress, if asked, would have accepted the deal. With Israel, then as now, many of the most sensitive agreements between the two countries have been based on similar presidential commitments. It has been a unique experience for American presidents and Israeli prime ministers, since both operate in democracies where domestic politics plays a key role in fashioning public policy. Rabin, Begin, and the Ford Letter No two personalities could have been more different. On the morning after the Ford letter reached Rabin, the prime minister invited Menachem Begin, the head of the opposition Likud party, to his office. Rabin was hoping for his support. The prime minister, once a general, was exhausted from the long negotiation, somewhat disheveled, a cigarette dangling from his lips. Begin, as always, was meticulous in dress and manner. Characteristically, he wore a dark suit, white shirt with a blue tie, and his shoes sparkled from a recent shine. A The Israel Model: Unprecedented and Unpredictable 201 bespectacled, deeply conservative lawyer, Begin was from the beginning highly suspicious of Rabin’s negotiations with Kissinger. He considered Rabin soft. “All one has to...