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Obama and AF-PAK: March 29, 2009
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93 twenty-three Obama and Af-Pak March 29, 2009 Throughout that winter there were many comings and goings involving Washington: Pentagon military, academics, think tank experts, State Department officials. ISAF mission headquarters were literally besieged, and the logistics people had to jump through hoops to find accommodation and make appointments for everyone. The reason was that once Obama had been elected, he immediately got to work to define his own strategy for Afghanistan, so the powerful American machine was immediately activated to provide him and his staff all the information they needed. This is the great thing about Americans: they have infinite means. Their system works frantically and, once it gets going, will churn out a full-scale analysis in which everything, even the most insignificant detail, is atomized and put through a sieve. Decisions are another matter altogether and may depend on several factors. Nonetheless, I’ve always thought Americans have a strong vocation for pragmatism and are generally free of preconceptions. Before they decide anything, they ask everyone, they listen, and if you do manage to persuade them, they will even change their plans and do exactly what you suggest. Kabul had great expectations for what the new occupant of the White House would decide. The same could be said for the capitals of NATO countries, as Obama would certainly want them to carry on doing their bit. We waited as the winter passed. And of course lack of news from Washington stirred the imagination of the Afghans. In Arg and the other corridors of power all sorts of predictions were bandied about, excluding no scenario. Rumor had it that when Vice President Biden returned from Kabul after a short visit in January, he remarked that if you asked ten Americans 23-2423-0 ch23.indd 93 6/3/13 1:54 PM 94 Afghan Lessons working on the ground what the U.S. objectives were in Afghanistan, you’d probably get ten different answers. He was trying to convince Obama that it was necessary first of all to clarify the objective of American involvement in the country. In fact, when Obama announced his plan on March 29, 2009, he couldn’t have stated it more clearly: “We must dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan,” he said to reporters thronging the White House press room. The objective—to stop the organization from doing further harm in the future—marked the first time that Washington had defined the purpose of its presence in the region with such precision. It was also the first time the American scope had widened to encompass Pakistan, whose no-man’s-land of tribal areas had been used by al Qaeda and its allies to rebuild their bases after leaving Afghanistan in 2001. This was what the United States was thinking about when it spoke of increasing resources in support of the Islamabad government to help stabilize the country and combat radicalism. The other new aspect of Obama’s plan was to send several hundred diplomats and experts to strengthen the international mission’s civilian sector and support reconstruction. He also spoke of dispatching four thousand more soldiers to train the Afghan army. Overall, these were indications of a break from the previous administration that Democratic voters had been expecting. America’s commitment in Afghanistan would continue and in some areas it would even be increased, but from now on it would be selective and favor areas hitherto neglected. So for the first time there was talk of a “civilian surge” rather than a “military surge,” which reassured everyone to some extent. It remained to be seen whether it was still possible to rectify the situation after eight years of conflict and, above all, if the civilian resources Obama promised could be found as quickly as the military contingent. My American sources told me that Biden’s caution had played an important part in this delicate juncture, where a compromise had evidently been reached between the president’s political and military advisers. Above all, however, Obama was motivated by the need to distance himself from his predecessor’s declarations. No one in the White House was going to be talking about building nations in the Islamic world based on a democratic model, as Bush had done. Indeed, from that moment on, all objectives would have to be redefined in line with ownership and sustainability criteria, avoiding excessive neocolonial ambitions and approaches. 23-2423-0 ch23.indd 94 6/3/13...