Managing India's Nuclear Forces

Hardware to Forces

142 M Managing India’s Nuclear Forces 6 Hardware to Forces There is a serious underestimation in India of the effort needed to transform nuclear hardware into operationally effective nuclear forces. The approach needed to create and operate nuclear forces, as opposed to exercising C & C over them, is not very different from that used in respect of conventional forces which use advanced technology equipment. The ‘nuclear button’ is directly and tightly controlled by the top political leadership in every country, other than Pakistan. Yet, in all these countries the basic pattern of managing nuclear forces — evaluation of hardware, creation of infrastructure, force and operational planning, training, and exercises — is essentially the same as that used for managing conventional forces. This commonality stems from the understanding that technological capability must be converted into operational prowess to produce effective deterrence. As a former US Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, has said ‘Deterrence . . . is not something free floating that exists independently of a credible implementation threat. It requires the most careful structuring of forces fully consistent with an agreed upon strategic concept’ (Nair 1992: 152), and as a former US Strategic Air Command (SAC) C-in-C, General Russell Dougherty, has written, ‘Deterrence is a healthy peacetime product of being well-equipped, well trained and competent to fight’ (Dougherty 1987: 422). Once the needed technologies are developed it is fairly easy to increase arsenal size through serial production of weapons. It is much more difficult to ensure that there is adequate preparedness for using the weapons effectively. The learning curve for employing nuclear hardware in conditions of war is steep and long. While political leaders and diplomats bear the onus of ensuring that there is no deterrence breakdown, it is the responsibility of the military, the supporting technical establishment , and the political leadership at the top of the command system to ensure that nuclear forces are ready to meet the challenge, if deterrence does break down. Hardware to Forces  143 Operational Capability In nuclear operations strategic objectives and operational performance are inseparable. What projects deterrence to the enemy leadership in a nuclear crisis is the true operational capability of the country’s nuclear forces to carry out nuclear strikes as required. This capability has three strands: sufficient military ability in terms of performance and survivability to back the country’s deterrence posture; the ability to operate forces safely and securely at all times; and the ability to exercise effective C & C under all circumstances. An array of hardware, however qualitatively and quantitatively impressive, cannot by itself produce any of these three strands of capability. Sound operational concepts, high military skills and the base provided by the manyfaceted infrastructure of the armed forces have to combine synergistically with nuclear hardware to be able to produce them. India has to move beyond the persisting political and technical conceptualisation of deterrence to an operational one where there is clarity with regard to operational objectives, plans and force structures. Nuclear forces rely on operational efficiency as much as on technical attributes and size. A disproportionate focus on technology and numbers can lead to missing much of the deterrence creation plot. The first strand of nuclear operational capability is military capability , which in turn is made up of the sub strands of lethality, reliability and survivability. Lethality corresponds to the extent of destruction that is considered necessary to make its prospect unacceptable to the adversary, and thereby deters him from taking certain courses of action. The estimation of this destruction level is based largely on cost-benefit calculations. The adversary’s approach to risk as well as pain also matters. Variations in the latter, even accounting for value differences among countries and regimes, will not be much because of the extreme lethality of nuclear weapons. While lethality determines the ceiling of destruction possible, the factors of survivability and reliability shall decide how much of the lethality potential can actually be realised. Pre-launch survivability of weapons is a serious issue. It is the number of weapons that survive enemy counterforce attacks, and not the number that was originally in the arsenal, that matters in damage expectancy calculations. By improving survivability the number of weapons that a country needs to maintain can be reduced. For deterrence to be effective it is 144  Managing India’s Nuclear Forces necessary for a large part of the arsenal to remain demonstrably survivable . Achieving survivability through LOW posture is not a practical...