Starting Over: Brazil Since 1985

6. Evaluating the Past and Looking to the Future

186 6 Evaluating the Past and Looking to the Future Anticipating Dilma Rousseff’s election as Brazil’s president, The Economist stated: “Success has bred an atmosphere of hubris in Brasília. With the outlook for the world economy so uncertain, that is potentially dangerous. . . . [T]here are three difficult sets of issues . . . Ms. Rousseff will have to deal with. The first is corruption . . . . The second concerns the role of the state in the economy. . . . The third test . . . will be in foreign policy.”1 There are questions regarding Brazil’s capacity to sustain its surge forward. Abiding Brazilian evolution within a problematic world is not a sure thing, but the past yields an optimistic appraisal. Important obstacles to cumulative progress arose in the last twenty-five years. Sometimes their origin was internal, such as episodes of political corruption, and sometimes external, as with the economic crises in Mexico, Asia, and Russia in the 1990s or the recent Great Recession. These episodes imposed real costs and delayed attention to more fundamental problems. Yet, as previous chapters have stressed, transformation has been comprehensive and far reaching. There has been a perceptible change in relative power of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Brazil returned to civil governance in 1985 with a powerful presidency as a heritage of prior military rule. While the 1988 Constitution seemingly diminished that influence, the reality was otherwise. The medida provisória and popular rejection of a prime ministerial 06-2143-7 chap6.indd 186 6/1/11 3:21 PM Evaluating the Past and Looking to the Future   187 alternative in 1993 meant presidential authority dominated. Presidents Cardoso and Lula productively used that power to achieve advances. That singular position has been slowly eroding. The National Congress has acquired greater say and increased its institutional capacities. This has happened not merely because constitutional amendments—and there have been many—require a three-fifths vote but for other reasons as well. Rules explicitly constraining executive authority have passed, such as the limit on the use of the medida provisória. There has been evident reluctance, especially in the absence of an economic crisis, to accept exactly what the executive has proposed. Congressional engagement might have moved faster if the political party structure were more consolidated and able to offer greater leadership. In its absence, a vigilant press has stood ready to inform the public, not always entirely accurately but sufficiently on the mark to ensure eventual governmental response. Judicial authority has been on the ascent. Efficiency has improved, although the number of court cases has risen significantly. Modern technology has helped the system cope. Recourse to injunction as a means of delay became less prevalent once privatization ceased. Constitutional Amendment 45 introduced a better organized legal structure. The súmula vinculante will help to ensure consistency in decisions on important matters. The Public Ministry has widened its prosecutorial focus; no matter of significance eludes its engagement. The Brazilian judiciary is one reason why reversion to democracy since 1985 has been able to work so well. The thrust toward federalism inherent in the 1988 Constitution partially turned into centralization because of economic circumstance. That trend has since reversed. States and municipalities are active political entities. Federal resources have regularly been transferred to local authorities —and so have responsibilities. What has failed to happen, despite frequent promises and draft laws, is real fiscal reform. Numerous charges and taxes are imposed, with consequent inefficiencies in their collection and subsequent redistribution to lower-level units. While the distortion engendered by state and local competition for investment seems to have abated, this issue calls out for permanent resolution. Brazil has experienced alternation in political leadership at all levels —municipal, state, and federal. Lula’s succession was facilitated by full cooperation from the Cardoso administration. Dilma, formerly head of the Casa Civil and also from Lula’s PT, has assumed office without problem. In a Latin America where popular leaders are tempted to stay 06-2143-7 chap6.indd 187 6/1/11 3:21 PM 188 Evaluating the Past and Looking to the Future beyond reasonable limits, President Lula wisely chose to desist. That decision strengthened Brazilian democracy and merits acclaim. Within the economic arena, there has been a virtual revolution. Objective data verify the change. Here is the simplest summary. In the last twenty-five years, real per capita income has gone from $7,318 to $10,607...