Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East

America, Europe, and the Crescent of Crisis

America, Europe, and the Crescent of Crisis Ivo Daalder, Nicole Gnesotto, and Philip Gordon The broader Middle Eastern region has become the central focus of U.S.-European diplomatic relations. Talks between senior European policymakers and U.S. officials are now often dominated by issues that arise from the threats to peace and stability that emanate from this troubled region. The Middle East looms equally large in public opinion on both sides of the Atlantic. Many Americans were furious with France and Germany when they refused to support the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Similarly, many Europeans have been very critical of what they perceive to be U.S. bias in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some Americans are as angry over Europe’s refusal to “get tough” with Iran as the Europeans are with America’s refusal to join in negotiations with Tehran. For all the increased talk and attention, however, America and Europe have been unsuccessful in forging a common approach to the region. Both sides agree that the Middle East is important, and recognition is growing that the lack of democracy and modernization throughout this part of the world poses grave problems for regional stability and international security. For this reason, the Group of Eight (G-8) leading industrialized countries, including the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and the European Commission, together launched a Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative in June 2004, which was designed to promote the political and economic transformation of the region. Yet, 1 01-1689 intro 11/15/05 6:13 PM Page 1 while unquestionably important, the transformation of the Middle East is at best a generations-long project. And although cooperation toward that objective might provide some glue to hold the transatlantic partners together, the goal of transforming the Middle East will never be reached if the more immediate and dangerous crises that have bedeviled the region are not addressed and resolved. The greater Middle East region is beset by a crescent of crises, ranging from Israel to Lebanon and Syria to Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. While each of these cases is obviously unique, the region as a whole is beset by many similar problems and challenges—like weapons proliferation , the lack of democracy, rampant population growth, terrorism, strategic threats, and economic stagnation. And while Americans and Europeans tend to agree that these issues are important, there is little transatlantic agreement on how to approach, let alone resolve, any of them. Nor is there agreement on the degree to which the United States and European Union should work together. Transatlantic differences over the Middle East crescent of crisis are regrettable—potentially even tragic—for at least three reasons. First, this region, always strategically important, is now central to the basic security of both Europe and the United States. No region in the world is remotely as relevant to some of the most important strategic issues of our time— from terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and energy supplies to immigration, narcotics trafficking, and religious conflict or peace. Even if the United States and European Union were somehow to succeed in achieving all their other goals elsewhere in the world, no American or European will be safe so long as the conflicts of the Middle East remain unresolved. U.S.-EU differences over the Middle East are also unfortunate because transatlantic cooperation is often necessary (if not sufficient) to reach common goals in the region. The problems of the region are challenging enough with the international community working together; they are nearly impossible to solve when the world’s two greatest repositories of military power, economic resources, and democratic legitimacy work at cross purposes. While the authors and editors of this volume disagree on many aspects of how to approach the various challenges the region presents , all agree that, when possible, joint U.S.-EU strategies improve the prospects for success in pursuing common interests. IVO DAALDER, NICOLE GNESOTTO, AND PHILIP GORDON 2 01-1689 intro 11/15/05 6:13 PM Page 2 Finally—and more than incidentally—the ability of America and Europe to agree on the Middle East will, more than anything else, determine the future course of transatlantic relations. The transatlantic alliance has been a pillar of world order for more than a half a century. But it was forged for a very different purpose—winning the cold war—and it has yet...