Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East

Afghanistan: Elements of a Transatlantic Nation-Building Strategy

It is nearly year five of the joint international stabilization and reconstruction effort at the Hindukush, which started in January 2002, after the U.S.-led military intervention Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Since then, the Afghan people and the international community have muddled through a painful nationbuilding process, characterized nevertheless more by progress than by failure and setback. Taking into account its very unfavorable situation to begin with—Afghanistan was left in shambles and ashes, both physically and economically, by more than twenty-three years of foreign occupation , war, civil war, and the Taliban reign of terror, with nonfunctioning state institutions and civil society torn apart—Afghans and the international community have achieved remarkable success. This is particularly significant against the background of the results of the peace- and statebuilding endeavors in Iraq and even in the Western Balkans. However, looking back to their first decade of joint nation-building experiences in various postconflict societies, Americans and Europeans, who have been the main providers of peacekeeping troops, trainers for the security sector reform (SSR) program, reconstruction experts, and aid funds, would agree that success in Afghanistan is far from ensured. A sustainable breakthrough at the Hindukush is still a long way off. Although the stabilization and reconstruction road map of the so-called Afghanistan: Elements of a Transatlantic Nation-Building Strategy Michael Schmunk 163 06-1689 section5 11/15/05 6:15 PM Page 163 Brahimi plan, formalized by the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, has been completed with the holding of parliamentary and provincial elections in September 2005, there is a common understanding that a post-Bonn agenda will have to renew the pact between Afghans and the international coalition dedicated to a peaceful, stable Afghanistan with sustainable economic growth. On both sides of the Atlantic, governments seem to be firmly intent on preventing “project Afghanistan” from failing again. The shock effect of the remote land at the Hindukush serving as a safe haven for Islamic terrorists prepared to attack Western societies anywhere in the world is still fresh and palpable. At least since late 2001, Western strategies , with varying approaches and different degrees of intensity, have been aiming at a reduction of Afghanistan’s potentially destructive role within the Islamist crescent of crisis as defined in this book. Progress attained so far in Afghanistan remains provisional and incomplete. Any withdrawal, for instance, of U.S. combat troops, NATO stabilization forces, or international reconstruction aid would almost certainly lead to a breakdown of the newly created political institutions, the security sector, and the first democratic and civil society achievements. It emerges that the international community will have to intervene in Afghanistan for quite a long time, at least as long as the Afghan people want it to do so, as guarantor of the still fragile order. This does not come as a surprise. The West has already learned this lesson in the Balkans, for example, where the international community to date has been involved for ten years in Bosnia and Herzegovina and for six years in Kosovo. There is no quick fix to helping a postconflict society to its feet again. Nation-building requires long-term commitments—particularly in “ground zero”–type situations such as Afghanistan. Too Many Tasks for Fewer and Fewer External Nation-Builders This mixed, but generally positive assessment is not shared by everyone inside Afghanistan or beyond. Some critics—obviously unaware of the complexity of problems and the time factor involved in such a huge nation-building task (Afghanistan is sixty times larger than Kosovo, with nearly 30 million inhabitants compared with 2 million!)—claim impatiently that the international community has fallen short of its promises and Afghan expectations. They criticize, above all, the continuing lack of public security, disturbing influence of warlords and militia leaders, weak MICHAEL SCHMUNK 164 06-1689 section5 11/15/05 6:15 PM Page 164 institutions of the central state, lack of local and provincial institutions, absence of the rule of law, the country’s apparent intention to succumb to becoming a “narco-state,” and the nonarrival of a sustainable economic recovery. These critics, it appears, are particularly unaware of the situation of the so-called “international community,” which consists, unfortunately, of no more than small, temporary coalitions of those states militarily and financially capable, and politically willing, to contribute to peace and state building by sending troops, trainers, experts, and...