Crescent of Crisis: U.S.-European Strategy for the Greater Middle East

Different Roads to Damascus

Different Roads to Damascus Flynt Leverett Coordination between the United States and Europe over implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559—especially after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005—appeared to many observers to exemplify the possibilities for restoring some measure of transatlantic cooperation regarding the Middle East. This coordination was critical to eliciting concerted international pressure on Syria, in the aftermath of the assassination, to withdraw its military and intelligence presence in Lebanon. Nevertheless, looking beyond the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, formally completed in April 2005, there is potential for divergence between American and European policies toward this part of the region during the next few years. The United States and Europe may be able to continue cooperation in supporting Lebanese economic recovery. Indeed, U.S.-European cooperation is providing the foundation for a so-called “core group” set up after Lebanese parliamentary elections in May-June 2005 to support the new Lebanese government that came out of those elections.1 But the United States and Europe—especially France—are likely to take different perspectives on how to handle the issue of disarming Hizballah in the context of completing the implementation of Resolution 1559. 77 04-1689 section3 12/5/05 3:18 PM Page 77 Even more significant, Washington and the European Union may ultimately take different approaches to dealing with Syria. Much is likely to depend on the final outcome of the United Nations inquiry into the Hariri assassination, led by German prosecutor Detlev Mehlis. —The United States, under a reelected Bush administration, appears increasingly disinclined to consider any kind of meaningful engagement with the Asad regime in Damascus. It also appears at least somewhat inclined to look favorably on the possibility of the Asad regime’s collapse. To the extent that the UN investigation into the Hariri assassination implicates Syrian officials, with more specificity than Mehlis’s interim report published in October 2005, the administration will seek to use the findings to ratchet up international pressure on the power structure in Damascus. —Europe, for its part, has no interest in encouraging regime change in Syria. If the Mehlis inquiry does not squarely assign complicity for the assassination to the Syrian leadership—or, if Syrian president Bashar alAsad is able ultimately to give up individual Syrian officials implicated by Mehlis to an internationally sanctioned judicial process, in a manner reminiscent of Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi’s handling of the Pan Am 103/Lockerbie case—many European countries are likely to support a cautious renewal of initiatives to engage Syria. Thus, if Asad is able to put the Hariri assassination behind him, once Mehlis has made his final report, and “move on” politically, there is potential for divergence between U.S. and European policies toward Syria, in particular. Whether and how this potential divergence between American and European policies plays out will do much to shape the strategic environment for a critical part of the Middle East for many years to come. This essay begins by reviewing the evolution of U.S. and European policies toward Syria and Lebanon, to illustrate how the United States, Europe, and the relevant regional parties have come to the present crossroads. The essay then looks more specifically at the potential for a transatlantic split over Syria and Lebanon, positing three scenarios for divergence of U.S. and European policies toward these countries. The U.S. Agenda It is important to understand the Bush administration’s evolving posture toward Syria and Lebanon in historical perspective. Over the course of successive administrations, Democratic and Republican, the United FLYNT LEVERETT 78 04-1689 section3 12/5/05 3:18 PM Page 78 States has defined an ambitious policy agenda toward Syria.2 U.S. policy toward Lebanon has been defined largely as an extension of that agenda. Since the mid-1980s, when the Reagan administration effectively abandoned Lebanon to Syrian hegemony, the removal of Syrian troops there and the promotion of greater effective Lebanese independence have been stated U.S. policy goals. Successive administrations, however, have not until recently been especially assiduous in pursuing those goals, because influencing Syria’s position on other regional issues was a higher priority for policymakers in the administrations of George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton. The U.S. agenda toward Syria has had both negative and positive dimensions. On the negative side, Syria has long been...