Things Fall Apart: Containing the Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War

Chapter 6: Lebabon: War After War (1975-90)

The Lebanese civil war that broke out in 1975 still plagues the Middle East today. The violence that broke out again between Hizballah and Israel in 2006 is just another round in this seemingly endless conflict. These recurrent cycles of bloodshed demonstrate both the impact that spillover can have on even strong neighboring states, and the difficulty of containing spillover. In particular, this case illustrates that once a civil war has blossomed into a regional war, it is difficult to bring it to an end because one or another of the neighbors typically has an incentive to oppose any specific set of peace terms (even if both agree that the war should be resolved), and it is far easier to play spoiler than peacemaker. Outbreak Lebanon is a multi-ethnic state. Over the centuries, numerous Middle Eastern minorities sought sanctuary in the difficult terrain around Mount Lebanon, where they could resist attack or persecution. As a result, Lebanon today is home to several Arab Christian denominations (most prominently, Maronite 6 Lebanon War after War (1975–90) 134 1379-1 ch06 4/16/07 11:48 AM Page 134 Catholic and Greek Orthodox), Sunni and Shi’i Muslims, and a variety of other sects, such as Druze and ‘Alawis, as well. Moreover, Lebanon was a recent invention—carved out by France after the First World War from the territory of Ottoman Syria to create a small Levantine state with a Christian majority, which Paris assumed, correctly, would make them more dependent on their new French suzerains. The new state was thus fragmented along a bewildering number of religious lines that made forming a unified state out of this sliver of territory a challenging endeavor. The Lebanese political system, established first in 1926 under the French but revised after independence in 1943, reflected both the patchwork nature of the state and Paris’s interest in having the Christians predominate. Christians were granted a permanent majority in parliament, along with permanent control of the presidency. In return, the prime minister was always to be a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the parliament a Shi’i Muslim . As Lebanon’s changing demographics quickly rendered these arrangements outdated, they became the basis of constant squabbling and unhappiness among the Muslim groups who sought political power commensurate with their share of the population. Nevertheless, Lebanon’s political fragility can also be exaggerated. There was a sense of shared community and nationhood within Lebanon that was not necessarily felt in other recently created Middle Eastern states. Élites from all communities interacted regularly, sharing bonds of education and class. In the early twentieth century, the Christians held a slim majority of the population, but in truth all of the communities were in a sense minorities and that status caused both fractiousness and a sense of a common destiny. Only Lebanon’s Sunni Muslims (who probably never represented more than one-quarter of the population) felt truly accepted by the larger Arab world.All of Lebanon’s other communities saw themselves as outcasts, and while they squabbled over power and resources, within Lebanon their sense of shared interests was also palpable. Lebanon’s history before 1975 was actually quite pacific by regional standards . The 1926 constitution and 1943 National Pact enshrined a number of important compromises among the key sects that laid the foundation for a functional democracy that was long considered a model for the rest of the Middle East. While there were constant spats among the different groups, these were seen as manageable by all sides well into the 1970s. Lebanon expecase study: lebanon 135 1379-1 ch06 4/16/07 11:48 AM Page 135 rienced two political“crises”in 1952 and 1958 (the latter prompting President Camille Chamoun to request that U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower dispatch U.S. Marines to prevent the fall of the country to Nasserist elements), but what is most noteworthy about those crises is how easily Lebanon overcame them. Indeed, in retrospect, the 1958 crisis was greatly overblown, with Chamoun essentially using the Eisenhower Administration’s tendency to overreact to threats even marginally linked to communism to circumvent constitutional limits on his powers and term. The 1952 and 1958 crises actually suggested considerable resiliency in the Lebanese system. Unfortunately, the problems it was forced to confront in the 1970s, principally, the sudden influx of armed Palestinian refugees who fled to Lebanon after they were expelled from...