A Skeptic's Case for Nuclear Disarmament

5. The Near-Term Agenda

108 5 THE NEAR-TERM AGENDA for those who support the nuclear disarmament vision but recognize the practical impediments to achieving it in the near future, the near-term nuclear agenda is unclear. Most advocates of global zero and other possible approaches to nuclear disarmament will naturally support a classic arms control agenda of further reductions in offensive forces, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the like. But is there any way in which the nuclear disarmament agenda meaningfully diverges from, or goes beyond, such traditional measures in the coming years? Addressing this question with focus is important. Otherwise, the new effort to rid the world of nuclear weapons risks being cynical, meaningless, or counterproductive. It could be cynical if, after statements such as President Obama’s Prague speech in April 2009, the great powers revert to classic behavior with no real hope or even intention of moving toward zero. It could be meaningless if they sincerely support the goal but do nothing beyond the next round of arms cuts to pursue it. After all, nuclear abolition has been an official goal of U.S. nuclear policy for forty years, to little apparent effect. Many arms control efforts have occurred subsequently, but they were motivated by desires to reduce forces, 05-0507-9 ch5.indd 108 7/23/10 3:29 PM THE NEAR-TERM AGENDA 109 advance stability and transparency, save money, improve safety, and check proliferation—not to rid the world of this category of armament altogether. On the other hand, prudence is required. It is critically important not to support any and all bold ideas out of enthusiasm for disarmament, since doing so could worsen, rather than mitigate, the risks of proliferation. The trick is to be bold without being careless or naïve, to move forward assertively without rushing. The following agenda, several elements of which are developed in further detail below, would seem to fit the bill. —The goal of nuclear disarmament should lead to deeper, quicker, and more permanent U.S. and Russian arms cuts than might otherwise be pursued in the aftermath of the New START Treaty, signed by Russia and the United States in April 2010. —Steps to improve verification in new areas, such as warhead dismantlement and a cutoff of fissile material production, should be pursued faster than might otherwise be the case—largely to develop procedures that could be of use for a nuclear disarmament regime down the road. —Highly enriched uranium (HEU) should be eliminated even more quickly than previously planned, for example, from U.S. aircraft carriers as well as from U.S., U.K., and Indian nuclear submarines. (Russia also uses fairly highly enriched uranium in submarines and icebreakers that could be replaced over time with less highly enriched uranium.)1 —Nuclear doctrine should move more clearly in the direction of minimizing the role of nuclear weapons in current security policy , while retaining the caveat about possible future “superbug” pathogens discussed in chapter 3. The Obama administration’s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is consistent with my recommendations on this point, although it retains more nuclear options against Iran and North Korea than seem optimal. —Missile defenses would seek to create collaborative ventures as much as possible, recognizing that cooperation on defenses will be essential if the great powers are to move together toward zero. 05-0507-9 ch5.indd 109 7/23/10 3:29 PM 110 THE NEAR-TERM AGENDA (The great powers should also show restraint in using space for offensive military purposes, though as I have argued elsewhere, it is difficult to create effective and verifiable arms control in this arena. Most measures should therefore be informal, with the possible exception of a negotiated ban on explosions that would cause debris above a certain altitude in space.) 2 Offensive Nuclear Weapons Further deep nuclear force cuts are possible now. Given the huge cold war arsenals the superpowers built up, considerable fractions of which remain today, the United States and Russia can move further in the general direction of zero without jeopardizing the core elements of nuclear deterrence. Beyond the simple matter of numbers, there is ample opportunity to minimize the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrine and nuclear deterrence concepts and to reduce the alert levels of remaining arsenals. From the viewpoint of a nuclear disarmament advocate, existing nuclear war–planning logic that is focused on creation of...