A Skeptic's Case for Nuclear Disarmament

Index

167 INDEX Page numbers followed by t refer to tables. Accidental use of nuclear weapons: cold war experiences, 36–37, 38; command and control vulnerability , 38–40; inadvertent escalation of conventional conflict, 39–40; international efforts to prevent, 2, 36; risk, 25, 35–36, 37–38; strategic plans leading to rapid escalation of conflict, 41 Acton, James, 55 Aegis anti-missile system, 136 Afghanistan, 65–66, 70 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 73, 80–81, 124 Alaska-California system, 136 Alert status of nuclear arsenal, 117 Allison, Graham, 43, 94 Al Qaeda, 42 Al Sammari, Wafic, 63 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, 134 Aso, Taro, 76 Aziz, Tariq, 63 Berlin crisis (1961), 29–30 Betts, Richard, 29, 35 Biological weapons threat: argument against nuclear disarmament , 48, 59–62; consideration of, in designing nuclear disarmament agreement, 62, 97–98; current status, 55–56, 57; future prospects, 58–59; monitoring production and supply, 58–59; nuclear deterrence, 5, 9, 17–18; use of nuclear force in response to, 20, 56–58, 59, 60–61, 116–17 Blainey, Geoffrey, 66 Blair, Bruce, 5, 38–39, 104, 117 Blair, Tony, 81 Blechman, Barry, 5, 26 Bomber force, 114 Brazil, 125 Brinkmanship, 30 Brodie, Bernard, 31 Bundy, McGeorge, 27, 35 08-0507-9 index.indd 167 7/23/10 3:27 PM 168 INDEX Bunn, Matt, 43 Bush (G. W.) administration, 54, 97, 111, 118–19, 134–35, 139 Campbell, Kurt, 34 Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons , 2, 117 Carter administration, 33 Cha, Victor, 30–31 China: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty policy, 119; conventional forces, 65; future prospects for disarmament, 115; nuclear capability, 65, 115; role in fostering global disarmament , 46; U.S. defense capabilities and, 88, 135–36; U.S. relations with, regional security concerns and, 72, 73–74, 78; U.S.–Russia nuclear capacity and, 111 Choubey, Deepti, 63 Clinton administration, 32, 119, 134–35 Cold war: justification for nuclear capability, 62; Non-Proliferation Treaty as product of, 12; risk of accidental detonation of nuclear weapons, 36–37; risk of inadvertent escalation of conflict , 40; risk of nuclear conflict, 25–32, 33; U.S. defense spending , 63–64 Command and control systems, 38–40 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: complete nuclear disarmament and, 120; concerns, 120; implications for nonnuclear states, 118, 124–25; prospects for U.S. ratification, 6, 119–20; recent history, 118–19; recommendations for ratification , 119; signatories, 119; significance of, in disarmament process, 121, 125; U.S. weapons development and, 121–22, 130; verification issues, 122–27 Conventional military forces: biochemical weapons threat, 59–60; consideration of threat from, in designing nuclear disarmament agreement, 98; deployment capabilities, 67–69; deterrent capability, nuclear deterrence versus, 15–16, 62–71; future prospects, 65; inadvertent escalation of conflict , 39–40; nuclear capability as deterrent to, 33; predicting outcomes of conflicts, 66–67, 70 Costs: benefits of reliable replacement warhead, 130–31; missile defense systems, 135, 138–39; savings from reduction in offensive capacity, 114–15; U.S. nuclear defense, 63–64 Cuban missile crisis, 27–28, 37 Dayan, Moshe, 32 De Klerk, F. W., 122 Deterrence. See Nuclear deterrence Dismantling of nuclear weapons: as goal of global disarmament, 9, 11, 82–83; removal of warheads from missiles, 117; verification of treaty compliance, 54–55. See also Rearmament D5 missiles, 114, 115 Dobbs, Michael, 28 Dulles, John Foster, 29 Earth-penetrating warheads, 121–22 Egypt, 72, 79 08-0507-9 index.indd 168 7/23/10 3:27 PM INDEX 169 Eisenhower administration, 29 El Baradei, Mohamed, 53 Epstein, Joshua, 66 Fissile materials: challenges to monitoring production and supply , 17, 44–45, 51–54, 94–95; current efforts to secure, 43–44; current production capacity, 55; current technology for detecting, 51–52; dismantlement of existing stocks, 54–55; efforts to curtail world supply, 2; estimates of existing stocks, 55; in former Soviet Union, 42; implementation of total ban on nuclear weapons, 92–93; near-term agenda for nonproliferation , 132–34; rearmament provisions of disarmament treaties , 104; recommendations for near-term agenda, 109; risk of terrorist acquisition and use, 41–42; security of, 42–43, 44; sequestering prior to abolition, 94; technology for producing, 52. See also Nuclear energy France, 81, 119 Gates, Robert, 90, 130 Geopolitical conditions: argument for delaying global disarmament negotiations, 85, 86–87; proliferation of nuclear capabilities , 12–13, 14–15; prospects for global disarmament discussions , 8, 18, 87–91, 143 Georgia, 8, 86, 88–89 Glaser, Charles, 48 Global...