A Skeptic's Case for Nuclear Disarmament

6. Conclusion

142 6 CONCLUSION a global zero accord that would eliminate all nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth is one of the most challenging propositions ever conceived in international politics. It is far ahead of its time. Even to pursue it seriously would be counterproductive, perhaps fostering the very nuclear proliferation dynamics that it would be designed in large part to counter. It would almost certainly never be truly verifiable, given the rigor required for such an absolutist accord. It would not necessarily be permanent, despite the hopes and expectations of its most fervent advocates. It would not necessarily limit the possible future use of a country’s nuclear arsenal to the sole purpose of deterring nuclear attacks by others, particularly given the potential for a future aggressor state to develop advanced biological pathogens. In other words, a nuclear disarmament treaty would be saddled with limitations, caveats, and uncertainties. And yet, such an accord is a very good idea. That is, nuclear disarmament is a worthwhile goal for the international community to adopt seriously. President Obama was right to give a major speech on the subject early in his presidency; other world leaders have been right to promote the idea as well. Obama and others should continue to look for meaningful and pragmatic, measured ways to advance the idea of eliminating nuclear weapons even 06-0507-9 ch6.indd 142 7/23/10 3:29 PM CONCLUSION 143 now that many of the initial, lofty speeches have been delivered and the grandiose goals articulated. The objective of eliminating nuclear weapons has been stated American policy since the Johnson administration. It is a core element of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the basic bargain in that 1968 accord between nuclear and nonnuclear states. In that regard, recent attention to the subject merely reiterates what has been U.S. policy for every U.S. president between Johnson and Obama—Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, the first Bush, Clinton, and the second Bush. Critics and skeptics are generally correct in their doubts about a nuclear abolition treaty. They are egged on by treaty advocates who often make challenges to aspects of such a regime seem straightforward to surmount when in fact they are not. For example, the notion that the United States has such overwhelming conventional military dominance as to make threats such as those posed by weapons of mass destruction superfluous is belied by the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan this decade, not to mention centuries of military history (and common sense). The challenges to achieving a nuclear disarmament treaty are enormous. The world is nowhere near ready for such an accord to be negotiated. Great-power relations need to be stabilized, major irredentist issues from Taiwan to Kashmir to the Middle East and the Caucasus resolved, and further measures to monitor arms control accords honed before any treaty-writing process should begin. And, of course, we are probably decades away from a world in which all known and suspected nuclear powers would actually sign up to such a treaty—a necessary precondition for any of them to implement it. But despite all the impediments, a way ahead can be seen. The effort to eliminate nuclear weapons can never move too far ahead of the state of world politics more generally, but it can be a useful complement to other measures that include old-fashioned military deterrence and at times the actual use of military force to create 06-0507-9 ch6.indd 143 7/23/10 3:29 PM 144 CONCLUSION a more stable and just international order. And real things can be done, in terms of arms control, military doctrine, and approaches to offensive nuclear arms control as well as deployment of future missile defenses, that not only would be influenced by the nuclear disarmament agenda but would also perhaps serve to advance that agenda. It is too soon to know if nuclear disarmament will be possible; even if a disarmament is achieved, it may not endure forever, and a great deal of attention must be devoted to the reconstitution issue, as this book has attempted to do. But the destructiveness of these weapons, and the likelihood that they cannot forever be safely maintained, deployed, and otherwise utilized as normal currency in international politics, makes it unwise to get too used to them. They are horrible instruments of death, not respectable and usable weapons, and we need...