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166 Synthesis and Analysis 6 1. While these measures of success provide some indication of the extent to which the projects worked as intended, a fuller discussion is found in the respective project’s case study section. Chapters 3 through 5 provide a rich foundation for assessing the experience to date with prospective interjurisdictional competition as well as with applications utilizing some of its various components. The present chapter provides a synthesis of this substantial experience to identify lessons learned concerning the effectiveness and relevance of the PIJC approach. This is viewed from several angles. First, section 6.1 examines the importance of the PIJC characteristics for project effectiveness, as listed in table 2-2. What do the case studies reveal about whether missing desirable design characteristics were necessary or superfluous—especially regarding the choice of incentive design mechanism (certification , competition, auction, bidding, and tournament)? With this analysis as a basis, the next two sections examine the effectiveness of the case study projects in terms of other performance criteria such as allocative efficiency and cost effectiveness (section 6.2), and sustainability and scalability (section 6.3). Section 6.4 considers the influence of initial conditions on the choice of incentive design. The final section of this chapter (6.5) applies the preceding analyses to the process of selecting the appropriate incentive design in different situations. Table 6-1, which reflects actual project implementation, summarizes the degree to which the case studies presented in chapters 3 and 4 mirror the characteristics of a full-fledged PIJC as well as succeed in meeting various criteria for project effectiveness.1 11601-06_Ch06-rev2.qxd 5/4/09 11:31 AM Page 166 synthesis and analysis 167 6.1 Influence of PIJC Design Characteristics on Project Outcomes As argued in chapter 2, to effect change or reform successfully, a sponsor’s intervention must explicitly or implicitly resolve several informational and incentive issues. For this reason, table 2-2 offered a list of “desirable” characteristics that one could incorporate into a PIJC design to address as many of these issues as necessary and feasible. With the design steps introduced in section 2.1 as a guide, one can examine the case studies to determine whether their degree of project success or failure was due to the inclusion or exclusion of these characteristics—or whether they were superfluous. Each step begins with a brief summary of its applicability. 6.1.1 Assessment of Problem The successful intervention will need to begin with a correct assessment of what is “broken.” Such an assessment may be done by the sponsor or by the recipients or their representatives—for example, government. (Recall from table 2-2 that all incentive designs are amenable to being driven by beneficiary demand and by collective action, in particular.) This assessment has two parts: identifying the symptoms and identifying the causes. Recipients may not be aware of causal symptoms since they have lived under them for so long. Thus symptom identification can benefit from the observations of an outside authority. However, a recipient may not agree that the symptoms are a problem so that any further intervention by a sponsor may encounter resistance . In the case studies, assessments are carried out by the recipient (Galing Pook, Senegal literacy initiative, and KDP), the donor (Russian fiscal reform, Nigerian LEEMP scorecard, Honduran mancomunidades project), both (MCC), or neither (in the Indonesian PROPER, it is done by the regulatory authority). It is even less likely that recipients will be aware of the true causes of the symptoms under which they suffer. It is not surprising, therefore, that identification of causes is typically the purview of the sponsor or initiating NGO, which also draws up the final list of goals to certify or reward. In PIJCs with a small number of participants , these can be based on stakeholder input, as was the case in the Jharkhand report card and the KDP. In PIJCs with a large number of participants, such input is harder to solicit (Galing Pook) but not impossible (the Romanian “Simple and Fast” deregulation reform). When the sponsor has its own view of what constitutes merit, then no stakeholder input may be solicited. This is the case for MCC candidacy and for the Russian fiscal reform project. There can be a role for sponsor facilitation here. Sponsors can educate stakeholders about the existence of symptoms and their causes, as in the case of the Russian fiscal reform, mancomunidades project, and Jharkhand report card. They can create...

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