Difficult Transitions: Foreign Policy Troubles at the Outset of Presidential Power

9. Transition Verities: The 2008–09 Presidential Transfer

9 144 In late 2000, on one of the last of his dozens of trips to the island of Okinawa as a Department of Defense representative in negotiations over the future contours of the American military presence there, Kurt Campbell realized that he just was not going to get it done. There were too many moving parts and complicated pieces to actually reach an agreement that could be successfully implemented between the United States and Japan. Although the two countries were the closest of allies, the negotiations over bases and over the legal and financial underpinnings of U.S. forward presence at times felt almost adversarial. It suddenly dawned on him that in a few months it would no longer be his responsibility, but that of his successor. Unfortunately, the timing of key financial decisions, operational decisions, and military deployments on Okinawa would come during the most difficult early days of the transition and a new administration. He hoped that whoever followed him in office understood the risks of transitions and that this delicate process of diversifying U.S. forces in the Asia Pacific region would continue uninterrupted after a short hiatus. But would it be possible to both sustain the momentum of the talks and transfer the necessary institutional knowledge to a new group of players inside the Pentagon? For Jim Steinberg, the final months of the Clinton administration were filled with implementing the agreements that successfully ended transition verities The 2008-09 Presidential Transition the war in Kosovo, dealing with the challenge of the North Korean nuclear program, and continuing the effort to contain the threat posed by Iraq. But since the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, no issue weighed more heavily on the outgoing administration than the threat posed by al Qaeda. Although planned attacks on the United States around the millennium were thwarted by focused effort and good luck, Steinberg and his colleagues knew that the terrorists had not abandoned their intention to strike at the United States. During the weeks before the new Bush administration took office, Steinberg was asked to come to the heavily secured transition offices, just a few blocks from the White House, to meet with his recently announced successor, Steve Hadley. The two were well acquainted from years of service in alternating administrations, and the conversation was cordial. They reviewed a broad range of issues, and finally turned to the threat of terrorism. Steinberg told Hadley that if the new administration accepted only one piece of advice from the outgoing one, it should be to retain Richard Clarke as the counterterrorism czar. Although Clarke had a reputation for sometimes contentious leadership, Steinberg argued that his intimate knowledge of the threat and of U.S. plans to address it would be irreplaceable in the early days of a new administration. Hadley smiled, but remained noncommittal. Steinberg left the room wondering just what approach his successor would take toward this looming threat. These kinds of questions invariably haunt the minds of national security officials during presidential transitions. Policy, professional, and personal uncertainties are part and parcel of the process. These uncertainties are unavoidable and are inherent in the very idea of transferring power. Foresight and careful planning can help mitigate the predictable risks, but the greater challenge is in developing strategies involving people , processes, and policies that guard effectively against the unpredictable risks. To paraphrase former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld , a presidential transition poses the problem of known unknowns and unknown unknowns—not to mention expected and self-instigated problems that are either blundered into or triggered unintentionally. This book has sought to identify these dangers to help the next administration prepare for the challenges to come. transition verities for 2008–09 145 As we have illustrated, there is a profoundly human dimension to transitions as individuals take on the mantle of responsibility for the nation’s security. Even those with extensive government experience find themselves nearly overwhelmed by the enormous personal commitment and sacrifices required to handle the crushing workload heaped on them through the transition period and into the new term. For many, this comes hard on the heels of a punishing campaign as well. Unexpected bumps in the road, including personnel problems involving scandals or baggage, as well as adverse media attention, can distract key players in even a well-executed transition from other, more...