Pax Syriana: Elite Politics in Postwar Lebanon

Elite Attitudes on Syriaand Sectarianism

187 Elite Attitudes on Syria and Sectarianism With an understanding of the historical trajectory of the Lebanese system and of the characteristics of established and emerging political elites, we can now turn to an examination of the elite discourse on issues of national and strategic interest. In this chapter, I will describe the parameters of recent national debates in Lebanon and identify the most pressing issues for the political future of the country. My fieldwork in Lebanon indicates that the central topics of concern in recent decades can be divided into two main categories: Lebanese-Syrian relations and the deconfessionalization of the political system. Elite Attitudes Toward Syria Syria’s influence has been both inescapable and controversial since the signing of the Ta’if Agreement in 1989 and the Treaty of Brotherhood and Cooperation in 1991—agreements that the Syrian regime quickly interpreted to further its own interests. By exerting influence over the management of large-scale reconstruction efforts that took place in Lebanon after the war, Syria was able to tie its national economy to Lebanon’s. Individual members of the Syrian political and military elite stood to make millions, if not billions, of dollars in personal profit from these endeavors.1 Such an incentive, combined with the Syrian military presence that had been established in Lebanon since the start of the civil war, led to a postwar situation in which there were serious penalties for any attempt by the Lebanese—and especially by Christians—to shake the 188  Pax Syriana Syrian grasp on their country. During this time, the refusal to accept the status quo in the relations between the two countries was mainly limited to the marginalized remnants of the Christian opposition, especially to sympathizers of the exiled general Michel Aoun and to the followers of the jailed leader of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea. The complex economic, political, and military relationship that developed between the two countries in the decade after the Ta’if Agreement has been described by the late Lebanese journalist Samir Qassir as a “Syrian protectorate”— a state of affairs in which the tenuous stability of the Lebanese state was achieved at the cost of obligatory alliances between the Lebanese and Syrian elites.2 Syria continued to enforce and legitimize its influence over Lebanese political life throughout the 1990s. During this decade, public discussion of the relationship between the two countries remained taboo. The matter was not a part of the national discourse in either country, nor was it discussed by the press in Lebanon. This situation first began to change in March 2000, when Gebran Tueni published his open letter to Syrian heir Bashar al-Assad. Tueni made it clear that the Lebanese people were questioning the future of their country and the necessity of the Syrian military presence and that they believed Syria had never truly recognized Lebanon’s independence. In the name of the Lebanese people, Tueni asked for a redeployment schedule for the Syrian army and for Syria’s recognition of Lebanese autonomy in negotiations with Israel. The discursive opening that Tueni’s letter provided was reinforced by two crucial events that occurred in the following months: the Israeli withdrawal from the South of Lebanon in May 2000 and the death of Syrian president Hafez al-Assad in June. The withdrawal of Israeli forces deprived Syria and its allies of a major legitimizing argument for the Syrian presence in Lebanon. With the country no longer occupied, many began to question the basis for Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs. Meanwhile, the death of Hafez al-Assad heralded a period of uncertainty and transition in Syria, which decreased the political and material influence of Syrian political actors in Lebanon. Syria was now ruled by a young and inexperienced leader, who was struggling to maintain a fragile consensus among the various political factions in his country. Further, Elite Attitudes on Syria and Sectarianism  189 Tueni was correct in describing Bashar al-Assad as a relatively progressive voice in Syria: during the first two years of the heir’s presidency, he implemented a campaign to promote liberalization and transparency in the Syrian government. This era came to be known as the Damascus Spring, a brief time of political opening in Syria when once-taboo topics such as public freedoms, human rights, and the problem of corruption were openly discussed. This period of opening did not last long—the call for political...