The International Politics of the Persian Gulf

Notes

259 Notes 1. The Changing International Relations of the Persian Gulf 1. A number of recent works analyze the processes of social and economic change underway in the Persian Gulf region, some of the best of which include Christopher Davidson, Dubai: The Vulnerabilities of Success (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2008); Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Steven Wright, eds., Reform in the Middle East Monarchies (London: Ithaca Press, 2008); Abdulhadi Khalaf and Giacomo Luciani, eds., Constitutional Reform and Political Participation in the Gulf (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006); and Laurence Louer, Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2008). 2. The Emirates Center for Strategic Study and Research (ECSSR) has, however, published a number of works on specific aspects of the Persian Gulf’s international relations, some of which include: The Gulf Oil and Gas Sector (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 2006); The Gulf: Challenges of the Future (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 2005); and International Interests in the Gulf Region (Abu Dhabi: ECSSR, 2004). Also noteworthy is Eckart Woertz, ed., Gulf Geo-Economics (Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2007). For a survey of some of the literature on the international relations of the Persian Gulf see Fred Lawson, “From Here We Begin: A Survey of Scholarship on the International Relations of the Gulf,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 36, no. 3 (Dec. 2009): 337–57. 3. Perceptions to the contrary, in 1973 the Arab states did not actually impose an oil boycott on Japan and the West. In fact, during the supposed embargo, Middle Eastern oil production steadily grew, although speculation and fears of an embargo led to a massive rise in oil prices. See Giacomo Luciani “Oil and Political Economy in the International Relations of the Middle East,” in International Relations of the Middle East, ed. Lewis Fawcett (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), 89. 4. Energy Information Administration, International Data, Natural Gas Reserves, http://www .eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/contents.html, accessed May 12, 2009. Russia’s natural gas reserves are estimated at 1,680 trillion cubic feet, or nearly 27 percent of the total world reserve. 5. Alaa Abujbara, “LNG Supply with Emphasis on Qatar’s Role in Global LNG Market,” paper presented at the 23rd World Gas Conference, Amsterdam, 2006, 3. 6. Jensen Associates, The Outlook for Global Trade in Liquefied Natural Gas Projections to the year 2020 (Weston, MA: Jensen Associates, 2007), 1. 7. “Chokepoints” refer to narrow channels along widely used sea routes. 260 | Notes to Pages 5–7 8. Energy Information Administration, World Oil Transit Checkpoints, http://www.eia.doe .gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html, accessed on May 12, 2009. 9. Anthony Cordesman, “The One True U.S. Strategic Interest in the Middle East: Energy,” Middle East Policy 8, no. 1 (Mar. 2001): 117. 10. Data for 2007 accessed through Hasan M. Qabazard, ed., OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2007 (Vienna: Ueberreuter Print und Digimedia, 2008). Data for 2009 collected from Energy Information Administration, International Data, Petroleum (Oil) Reserves, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ emeu/international/contents.html, accessed on May 12, 2009. 11. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “U.S. Foreign Policy, Petroleum, and the Middle East” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), 12. 12. Ibid. 13. Cordesman, “One True U.S. Strategic Interest,” 117. 14. The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States, issued by the White House, is illustrative of the official US perception of Iran at the threat it posed to regional stability, at least during the presidency of George W. Bush from 2000 to 2008: We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran. For almost 20 years, the Iranian regime hid many of its key nuclear efforts from the international community . Yet the regime continues to claim that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons . The Iranian regime’s true intentions are clearly revealed by the regime’s refusal to negotiate in good faith; its refusal to come into compliance with its international obligations by providing the IAEA access to nuclear sites and resolving troubling questions; and the aggressive statements of its President calling for Israel to “be wiped off the face of the earth.” The United States has joined with our EU partners and Russia to pressure Iran to meet its international obligations and provide objective guarantees that its nuclear program is only for peaceful purposes. This diplomatic effort must succeed if confrontation is to be avoided. As important as are these nuclear issues, the United States has...