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11 THE BATTLE OF PLATTSBURGH The two armies and Macdonough's ships waited five days for the arrival of Downie's fleet, which was still not ready because of the ConJulnce. Downie's manpower was adequate, but just barely. He had plenty of sailors for the large vessels; the Thirty-ninth Regiment provided much of the crews of the twelve gunboats, and about seventy men from the Third Battalion of the Canadian Militia were distributed in three of them. The gun crews of the Confi(lnce first went to their stations on September 8, although supplies for equipping her guns were still lacking. Nevertheless, the fleet moved out from Isle-aux-Noix on the 7th, but in the movement southward the Confioance grounded as she came out of the Richelieu. She was floated again without damage, and the fleet joined Pring at Isle La Motte on the 8th. They remained there for the next two days while work went forward on the Con/iance; her last carpenters left the ship at Cumberland Head just before the battle. The gun crews had their first practice on the 9th, and on the evening of the 10th, navy and army officers met at Chazy Landing for an elegant dinner served on casks covered with boards and fine table cloths.I Meanwhile, Prevost tried to advance the date of the fleet's sailing by every sharp word he could think of. Downie told him on the 7th: "Conceiving that the moment I can put this ship in a state for action, shall be able to meet them." Next day Prevost, in urging more haste, laid out his plan for a joint operation: I only wait your arrival to proceed against Genl. MaCoombe's last position on the South Bank of the Saranac. Your share in the operation in the first instance , will be to destroy or capture the Enemy's Squadron if it should wait 179 180 THE WAR OF 1812 IN THE CHAMPLAIN VALLEY for a contest, and afterwards cooperate with this Division ofthe Army, but if it should run away and get out of your reach, we must meet here to consult on ulterior movements.> On the same day Downie replied emphatically that I stated co you rhar the Ship was not ready - she is not ready now, and until she is ready, ir is my Duty nor co hazard the squadron before an Enemy, who will even rhen be considerably superior in force. On the 9th, Prevost told him he had postponed moving on the forts, but "I need not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both Services from delay." On the same day Downie wrote Prevost that he expected to sail on the 10th; however, contrary winds prevented him from doing so. Bitingly, Prevost pointed out that he had had his troops in readiness for an attack since six o'clock that morning, and that "I ascribe the disappointment 1 have experienced to the unfortunate change of wind and shall rejoice to learn that my reasonable expectations have been frustrated by no other means." This correspondence is important not only because it reveals the relations between the two services just before the battle, but also because it was the navy's prime evidence in a subsequent court-martial. Downie finally sailed on the morning of the 11th. He knew the size and disposition of his opponent within Plattsburgh Bay, but he relied on his superiority to assure him a victory, and his advantages were numerous. He possessed only eight guns more than Macdonough, but they were considerably better at long range, while Macdonough's numbered more carronades, terribly destructive at short range, like a shotgun firing slugs. Downie had about 100 more men in his ships' complement, and his total tonnage was about 200 more than Macdonough's. The Confiance, with its thirty-seven guns, could fire a broadside only ninety-six pounds short of the long-gun broadside of the entire American fleet, and the Linnet exactly made up the differencethe two ships equalled the long-range firepower of the entire American fleet, and the British still had the Chub (formerly the Growler) and the Finch (once called the Eagle), with eleven guns apiece. * Unaccountably, Downie rose to Macdonough's bait by engaging him inSIde Plattsburgh Bay. His long-range superiority would have made it possible to pound Macdonough into submission from a distance without suffering from his huge carronades. Stopping off Cumberland Head, he reconnoitered Macdonough...

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