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5. Democratic Theory and the Democratic Agent
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5 DEMOCRATIC THEOR Y AND THE DEMOCRATI C AGENT DIANA T. MEYERS Democratic theorie s a s oppose d a s thos e o f Jame s Buchana n and Benjami n Barber , no t t o mention th e man y shade s of opin ion i n between , advocat e libert y an d equality—th e tw o value s that hav e assume d preeminenc e i n modern democrati c theory. 1 Despite th e divergen t interpretation s o f thes e value s proffere d by differen t theories , libert y an d equalit y ar e see n a s valuabl e from th e persona l a s well as the socia l point o f view. The right s that libert y an d equalit y mandat e shiel d individual s fro m th e frustrations an d humiliation s o f others ' unwarrante d interfer ence o r pretende d superiority . Moreover , throug h th e enfran chisement o f every citizen, democratic theorie s capitalize on th e distinctive contribution s t o societ y tha t individual s ar e capabl e of making . I n th e privac y tha t democrac y accord s individual s and i n the role it invites them t o play in political life, democrac y pays homage t o the dignity o f human agents , as such. In thi s chapter , I explor e th e conception s o f th e sel f tha t underlie thre e type s of democratic theory: public-choic e theory , radical-participation theory , an d majoritaria n theory . M y objec I am grateful t o the editors of this volume for thei r helpful comment s on earlie r versions of thi s chapter . Democratic Theory and the Democratic Agent 127 tive i s to develo p a n accoun t o f th e democrati c agen t tha t ren ders democracy's characteristic respect fo r person s intelligible. I begin b y arguin g tha t bot h th e individualisti c sel f associate d with public-choic e theor y an d th e socia l sel f associate d wit h radical-participation theor y lac k a convincin g accoun t o f indi vidual integrity . Neithe r sufficientl y anchor s persona l identit y to accoun t fo r th e individua l interest s democrati c institution s are designe d t o secur e an d th e individua l capabilitie s demo cratic institutions ar e designed t o tap. I then furnis h a n alterna tive conceptio n o f th e self—th e self-definin g agent—an d I ar gue tha t thi s conceptio n support s a n explicatio n o f individua l integrity tha t make s sense of the democratic view of the person . My conclusions regardin g th e natur e o f th e democratic agen t seriously undermin e th e conception s o f consensu s tha t public choice theor y an d radical-participatio n theor y respectivel y up hold . Thes e tw o conception s presuppos e a sel f s o adaptabl e t o its political surrounding s tha t individua l integrit y collapse s int o selfish o r ignoran t obstinacy . Consequently , neithe r o f thes e theories is sensitive to the pain tha t compromised integrit y brings , and neithe r adequatel y protect s peopl e fro m it . In contrast , Ia n Shapiro' s chapter , "Fou r Fallacie s Concern ing Majorities , Minorities , and Democrati c Politics, " rejects con sensus as the goa l of democrac y an d treat s majoritaria n democ racy as an ideolog y o f oppositio n i n th e nam e o f empowermen t and empowermen t throug h opposition . I a m sympatheti c t o many o f Shapiro' s claim s abou t democracy ; fo r example , hi s stress on th e ways in which majorit y rul e facilitates realignment s of powe r an d o n th e inabilit y o f popula r sovereignt y t o elimi nate socia l conflict . Bu t I hav e som e reservation s abou t Shapi ro 's view—reservation s tha...