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“Characteristics Arbitrary from a Moral Point of View” Conflicting Commitments In this section I outline why immigration rules pose significant problems for liberal theory and liberal democratic societies. I argue here that the problems arise, fundamentally, from within liberal theory itself, and from two different types of liberal commitments. On the one hand, liberal theorists have articulated ideas of equality and fairness in a way that rejects arbitrary factors as a ground for greater rights or privileges. On the other, liberal theorists have either insisted on, or assumed the need for, a bounded nation-state, with enforceable borders and a relatively clear set of rules to determine membership. At the outset, these values would seem not to conflict—ideally, a liberal nation-state, with a fixed and determinate membership, would guarantee equality and fairness to all members irrespective of qualities such as race or gender or some other arbitrary criteria . But what happens in less than ideal circumstances, when persons cross national boundaries and find themselves in liberal societies that either do not want them or treat them unfairly? On what grounds can liberal nation-states deny the claims and needs of persons who, by accident of birth, were not “born” as members? This chapter approaches these questions by examining briefly the nature of the first of the two liberal commitments in question. I shall refer to the first principle as the principle against ascriptive status: briefly, the principle holds that persons should not be entitled to a greater share of privileges or opportunities, nor be denied basic rights and opportunities, based on characteristics that are morally arbitrary. This principle reflects notions of equality, but does not necessarily begin with the premise that all persons are morally equal in one sense or another. Rather, the idea relies more on an understanding of what the principle of “equality” 2 11 requires—that no person ought to enjoy political or social advantage, or suffer similar disadvantage, based on morally arbitrary characteristics. In other words, the principle is normative, not descriptive: it does not say, for example, that all persons are morally equal, but it says that no one ought to be treated advantageously, or disadvantageously, based on a characteristic for which he or she is not responsible. An explanation of the second, competing principle in liberal theory is contained in the following chapter, but to sketch it briefly here, it is the principle of sovereignty, understood to mean that liberal nation-states have the right to self-determination and territorial integrity, which would necessarily entail control over their boundaries and membership. The principle is grounded on notions of self-determination—the basic idea that once political communities are properly organized, their members have a presumptive right to pursue collectively what is in their own selfinterest . In classic accounts of this principle, as we shall see, the right of self-determination is often simply asserted, as though formal justification were either unnecessary or self-evident. Notions of territorial integrity, cohesion within political communities, appeals to cherish and protect a distinctive political culture, and the right of self-defense against aggression —these all stem from this fundamental commitment, and liberal nation -states have long operated as though the principle has long been descriptive as well as normative. To clarify further how these commitments are expressed in liberal theory , this section focuses on three influential theorists in particular—John Locke, John Stuart Mill, and John Rawls—while drawing from the works of other contemporary theorists as their arguments reflect or criticize the dominant themes presented in the primary works of these important thinkers. Locke, Mill, and Rawls are certainly not the only important liberal theorists for this type of study, but because they represent to some extent the libertarian, utilitarian, and egalitarian strains of liberalism, a discussion of central themes that run throughout their work can illustrate recurring , dominant themes in much of liberal theory overall. This section is certainly not intended as an exhaustive discussion of the basic values of liberalism, if such a thing is even possible; rather, the point is to describe how liberal commitments to equality and fairness rest on mitigating the effect of characteristics that seem “arbitrary from a moral point of view,” to use Rawls’ phrase, while at the same time showing how ideas of sovereignty and self-determination remain a central facet of liberalism, even when they rely tacitly on arbitrary circumstances. To use a phrase from 12...

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