Control: A History of Behavioral Psychology

Notes

Notes n o t e s to t h e i n t ro du c t i o n 1. See Brian D. Mackenzie, Behaviourism and the Limits of Scientific Method (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977); John M. O’Donnell, The Ori­ gins of Behaviorism: American Psychology, 1870–1920 (New York: New York University Press, 1985); Franz Samelson, “Struggle for Scientific Authority: The Reception of Watson’s Behaviorism, 1913–1920,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 17 (1981): 399–425; idem, “Organizing for the Kingdom of Behavior: Academic Battles and Organizational Politics in the Twenties,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 21 (1985): 33–47; and Laurence D. Smith, Behaviorism and Logical Positivism: A Reassessment of the Alliance (Stan­ ford: Stanford University Press, 1986). 2. See especially Mackenzie, Behaviourism and the Limits of Scientific Method. 3. See Willard D. Day, “On the Difference between Radical and Methodolog­ ical Behaviorism,” Behaviorism 11 (1983): 89–102; and Paul M. Churchland, Matter and Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), 23–25, 54–55. 4. John B. Watson, “Behaviorism as the Psychologist Views It,” Psychological Review 20 (1913): 158. 5. Samelson, “Struggle for Scientific Authority.” 6. B. F. Skinner, “Why Are Theories of Learning Necessary?” Psychological Review 57 (1950): 193–216. 7. In Edward C. Tolman, Drives toward War (New York: Appleton­Century, 1942). Also see Nancy K. Innis, “Drives toward War” (paper presented at a Che­ iron conference, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario, June 1989). 8. For a definitive account of the relationships between behaviorism and log­ ical positivism, see Smith, Behaviorism and Logical Positivism. 9. See John B. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1919), 322–33; and idem, Behaviorism (New York: People’s Institute, 1924), chap. 10. 10. See Richard S. Peters and Henri Tajfel, “Hobbes and Hull: Metaphysi­ cians of Behaviour,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 8 (1958): 30–44; John A. Mills, “Hull’s Theory of Learning as a Philosophical System: I. An 195 196 | Notes to the Introduction Outline of the Theory,” Canadian Psychological Review 19 (1978): 27–40; idem, “Hull’s Theory of Learning: II. A Criticism of the Theory and Its Relationship to the History of Psychological Thought,” Canadian Psychological Review 19 (1978): 116–27; idem, “The Genesis of Hull’s Principles of Behavior,” Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 24 (1988): 392–401; and Smith, Behav­ iorism and Logical Positivism, 155–62. 11. Finally, Tolman was a neorealist rather than a positivist. The neorealists were essentially materialists. 12. The behaviorists had two major antagonists in the field of animal sci­ ence. In North America Frank A. Beach led one group. See Ernest R. Hilgard, Psychology in America: A Historical Survey (New York: Harcourt Brace Jo­ vanovich, 1987), 415. The behaviorists’ other antagonists were the European ethologists, led by Konrad Lorenz and Nikko Tinbergen. Lorenz vehemently at­ tacked the behaviorists, especially in Evolution and Modification of Behavior (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965). He also disapproved of American comparative psychology, although eventually there was a rapprochement be­ tween him and Lehrman. See Robert A. Hinde, Ethology (London: Collins, 1982), chap. 10. 13. See comments on the Milgram experiment in Henderikus J. Stam, Ian Lubek, and H. Lorraine Radtke, “Repopulating Social Psychology Texts: Disem­ bodied ‘Subjects’ and Embodied Subjectivity,” in Reconstructing the Psychologi­ cal Subject, ed. B. Bayer and J. Shotter (London: Sage, in press). They state that the responses to Milgram’s manipulations were more varied and ambivalent than he reported in published accounts of his work. 14. John A. Mills, “The Origins and Significance of Clark L. Hull’s Theory of Value,” in Recent Advances in Theoretical Psychology, vol. 2, ed. W. J. Baker, R. van Hezewijk, M. E. Hyland, and S. Terwee (New York: Springer­Verlag, 1990), 335–45; idem, “Some Observations on Skinner’s Moral Theory,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 12 (1982): 140–60; and idem, “Purpose and Condi­ tioning: A Reply to Waller,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 14 (1984): 363–67. 15. Watson, Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist, 10 (emphasis in original). 16. Woodworth’s Experimental Psychology (New York: Holt, 1938) started life as a set of mimeographed notes that were modified from 1920 onward and known informally as the “Columbia bible.” For an analysis of Woodworth’s ap­ proach to experimental method, see Andrew S. Winston, “Cause and Experiment in Introductory Psychology: An Analysis...